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WHEN THE WELL RUNS DRY: A PROPOSAL FOR 
CHANGE IN THE COMMON LAW OF 
GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Teresa N. Lukas* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Current Massachusetts law governing the use of ground water 
leads to surprising legal conclusions if one is not familiar with the 
common law doctrine in this area. Three hypothetical disputes illus-
trate typical problems of ground water use. Consider the following 
situations: (1) A manufacturing company drills a well on its property 
and begins pumping water to be used in processing. A shallow well 
providing water for domestic use goes dry on adjoining residential 
property. If the injured landowner sues the manufacturer, what is 
the result? (2) Neighboring towns draw water from a common 
ground water source to supply the needs of their residents. During a 
drought Town A increases its pumping rate and effectively captures 
most of the supply. Does Town B have a remedy? (3) A private water 
company purchases land overlying an aquifer! and develops a well 
field with high yield wells. As a result of the company's activities, the 
water level in a nearby pond drops. May owners of land abutting the 
pond seek injunctive relief and damages for loss of the use of the 
pond?2 
In each of these conflicts the injured party has no remedy under 
present Massachusetts law. Massachusetts follows the common law 
* Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. An aquifer is a geologic formation which stores ground water and yields it to wells. See 
infra text and notes at notes 28-31. 
2. Similar hypothetical problems are posed in Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135, 74 P. 
766, 772 (1903). 
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doctrine of ground water rights which vests absolute ownership of 
ground water in the owner of the overlying land.3 This doctrine, 
known as the rule of absolute ownership, shields a landowner from 
any liability for ground water withdrawals which harm a neighbor's 
water supply.' Not surprisingly, this system of ground water rights 
has been characterized as the' 'rule of the biggest pump." 5 In light of 
present water needs, this rule is now inadequate as a means of 
resource allocation. 
Ground water plays an important role in meeting water needs in 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Between one-third and one-
half of the forty-five inches of average annual rainfall in this region 
first percolates into the ground to become part of the subsurface 
water supply.6 Approximately 45 percent of Massachusetts commu-
nities, mainly in rural and suburban areas of the state, draw all the 
water needed for domestic, municipal, agricultural, and industrial 
purposes from the ground, and another 24 percent of the communi-
ties are partially supplied by wells. 7 On Cape Cod, ground water 
reserves form the sole source of water supply.8 While Boston and 
other urban areas and many industries continue to rely solely on sur-
face water reservoirs, ground water withdrawals account for ap-
proximately 20 percent of total water consumption in Massachu-
setts.9 Although in the past Massachusetts enjoyed an ample water 
supply from both ground water and surface water sources, local 
shortages exist now,lO and larger deficits are projected for the 
future. ll Urban areas may seek to tap ground water sourees to sup-
3. Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1958). 
4. See infra text at notes 176-201. 
5. Coogan, Problems of Ground Water Rights in Ohio, 9 AKRON L. REV. 34, 65 (1975). 
6. Conversation with Dr. Michael H. Frimpter, Chief of Massachusetts Subdistrict, Water 
Resources Division, United States Geological Survey (October 30, 1981). 
7. SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION RELATIVE TO DETERMINING THE ADEQUACY OF WATER 
SUPPLY IN THE COMMONWEALTH, THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE GENERAL COURT OF 1981, at 77 
(House Rep. No. 6301, 1981) [hereinafter cited as THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION]. 
8. [d. 
9. Wallace, Floyd, Ellenzweig, Moore, Inc., MASSACHUSETTSWATER SUPPLY POLICY STATE-
MENT, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, COMMON-
WEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 160 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MASSACHUSETTS WATER SUPPLY 
POLICY STATEMENT]. 
10. For example, the average daily water consumption of Boston and 45 other communities 
served by the Metropolitan District Commission currently exceeds the safe yield of the Quab-
bin Reservoir, the Commission's principal source of supply. THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 77. See generally Quinones, Water: Our 
Dwindling Resource, Boston Globe Magazine, at 8, Aug. 9, 1981. 
11. MASSACHUSETTS WATER SUPPLY POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 176, Map 6-4. The 
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plement hard pressed surface water reservoirs.12 
While parts of Massachusetts are richly supplied with ground 
water, ground water is a finite resource and may be severely im-
paired by human activities. Some communities have simply grown 
beyond their ground water resources. IS Others have lost part or all 
of their subsurface water supply due to chemical contaminati<;m.14 
Unrestrained consumption, encouraged by the rule of absolute 
ownership, can cause harmful incidental effects as well as exhaust 
supplies. For example, excessive ground water withdrawals are 
responsible for low surface water levels in several areas of Massa-
chusetts, including the Ipswich River basin, Neponset River basin, 
and Lake Quinsigamond. 16 Over-pumping has also caused salt water 
intrusion into wells on Cape Cod.16 Problems associated with con-
tamination and excessive use lead to the conclusion that much like 
the water flowing in streams and rivers, ground water can no longer 
be taken for granted in Massachusetts. 
As more public and private users compete for the same resource, 
conflicts will inevitably develop. The rule of absolute ownership can-
not resolve water allocation problems because it is based on obsolete 
notions about the nature of ground water and the rights associated 
with land ownershipY Now, nearly 150 years after its first applica-
tion in Massachusetts,18 the rule of the biggest pump should be 
replaced by a judicial doctrine based on modern scientific knowledge 
about the movement of ground water and modern policies of re-
report predicts deficits in 151 of Massachusetts' 351 communities by 1990. 
12. Ground water has a number of advantages over surface water as a source of supply: 
capital costs for developing a well field are less than for constructing a reservoir; much less 
land area is required; water stored in the ground is not lost to evaporation; and, as water 
moves through the ground, some impurities such as solids and bacteria, are filtered out. THIRD 
INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 77. 
13. MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, 
GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 23-24 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS]. 
14. THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 85. 
Twenty-two incidents of water supply contamination are documented in CHEMICAL CONTAMI-
NATION: A WORKING PAPER FOR THE WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE OF THE SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE 
COMMISSION ON WATER SUPPLY (1979) [hereinafter cited as CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION: WATER 
QUALITY TASK FORCE]. Most of the incidents have been the result of improper disposal of toxic 
organic solvents by industry. Gasoline spills and other chemical wastes account for other inci-
dents.ld. 
15. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 26-32. 
16. Id. at 36. 
17. See infra text at notes 237-252. 
18. Greenleaf v. Francis, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 117 (1836). See infra text and notes at notes 
184-186. 
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source utilization. Recently the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court indicated a willingness to consider a fresh approach to issues 
of resource development and a landowner's obligations to neighbors 
affected by his use of his land.19 The jurisdiction may now be ready to 
reassess its ground water rule in the same light. 
This article will assess the common law rules of ground water 
rights and propose a new rule in this area for Massachusetts. First, 
basic principles of hydrology and common ground water problems 
will be described to provide a background for a discussion of ground 
water law. Next, the discussion will focus on a set of criteria which 
form the test for a rational and equitable system of ground water 
rights. These criteria will then be used to analyze the rule of absolute 
ownership and each of three other judicial approaches to ground 
water allocation-the American rule of reasonable use, the doctrine 
of correlative rights, and the rule of the Restatement of Torts. From 
the analysis of these alternative approaches, a rule which best 
satisfies the requirements of a modern system of water law will 
emerge. It is suggested that this rule should replace the inadequate 
doctrine which now governs ground water rights in Massachusetts. 
II. HYDROLOGY OF GROUND WATER 
A. The Hydrologic Cycle 
Water circulates from the atmosphere to the earth and back again 
in what is known as "the hydrologic cycle." 20 The familiar visible 
FIGURE 1 
eVAPok.A..TION 
The Hydrologic Cycle" 
"(MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, 
GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS (1979». 
19. Tucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (1978). See infra text at notes 
232-236. 
20. R. KAZMANN, MODERN HYDROLOGY 3-4 (1965). 
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parts of the cycle consist of the precipitation of rain and snow, the 
flow of water in streams and rivers to the ocean, and evaporation 
from the surface, forming clouds and renewing the cycle. The invis-
ible movement of ground water below the surface is not as well 
known, but is still an integral part of the water cycle.21 
Some of the precipitation which reaches the earth penetrates the 
soil or rock surface and percolates below the reach of plants to re-
charge, or replenish, the ground water.22 The water is drawn by 
gravity to a level below the ground called the zone of saturation, 
where the soil or rock is saturated with water. 23 The top of the zone 
of saturation is the water table.24 Below the zone of saturation, im-
permeable rock or clay prevents the further vertical movement of 
water. Ground water also responds to gravity by flowing horizontal-
ly and downhill through the zone of saturation.25 Where the water 
table intersects with the land surface, ground water is discharged 
and flows onto land in a spring, stream, lake, or wetland.26 These 
occurrences are surface manifestations of the water table. The 
movement of ground water is slow, usually measured in feet per 
year, unlike the rapid flow of surface water which is measured in feet 
per second.27 
Significant quantities of ground water occur in aquifers, geologic 
formations of permeable material such as gravel or sandstone, which 
hold water in the spaces between solid grains and are capable of 
yielding water to wells.28 An artesian aquifer is one in which water is 
held under pressure; the pressure forces water to rise in a well to a 
level above the water table or even to flow out onto the surface.29 In 
an ordinary water table aquifer, however, pumping is required to 
bring the water to the surface.30 In addition to transmitting ground 
water to wells, aquifers filter solids and some chemicals from ground 
water and provide underground storage for water. 31 
21. See Figure 1. 
22. An area in which precipitation or surface water is absorbed into the ground is called a 
recharge area. R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 130. 
23. ld. at 129. 
24. ld. at 130. 
25. Baldwin and McGuinness, A Primer on Ground Water, Geologic Survey 8 (a report pre-
pared for the United States Dep't of the Interior, 1963). 
26. R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 143-144. 
27. Baldwin and McGuinness, supra note 25, at 7. 
28. R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 130. 
29. Baldwin and McGuinness, supra note 25, at 9. 
30. ld. at 6. 
31. R. KAzMANN, supra note 20, at 161-162. 
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Before an aquifer is developed for use as a municipal water supply, 
extensive testing is usually undertaken to determine its productivity 
as well as the rate and direction of ground water flow. 32 The yield, or 
amount of water transmitted by an aquifer, depends on such factors 
as the size and uniformity of mineral grains, the depth of the geo-
logic formation, and the amount of recharge received from the sur-
rounding surface area.33 Safe yield is the maximum rate at which 
water can be pumped from an aquifer without impairing the quantity 
or quality of water. 34 
In addition to its importance for water supply, ground water per-
forms an essential function in the hydrologic cycle by discharging 
water to streams and ponds and maintaining base stream flows dur-
ing dry periods.36 Because of its slow movement, ground water dis-
charges gradually, while run-off from storms flows rapidly through 
streams. Ground water thus continues to feed into surface flows 
when precipitation decreases. In the eastern United States most 
rivers, streams, and lakes are fed by ground water. 36 Since ground 
water and surface water are often hydrologically connected, it is er-
roneous to consider ground water an independent alternative to sur-
face water supplies.37 Planning for the utilization of ground water 
should take into account effects on surface water as well.38 
B. Sources of Ground Water Supply in Massachusetts 
Massachusetts is generally well supplied with water. Annual pre-
cipitation, ranging from forty to fifty inches per year, is significantly 
32. For a description of methods used by hydrologists to study the ground water system, 
see J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 452-57 (1968); R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 
152-158. 
33. Conversation with Dr. Michael H. Frimpter, supra note 6. 
34. R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 159. 
35. [d. at 58. 
36. [d. at 139. In arid western regions the opposite is true, and ground water is dependent 
on streams and rivers for recharge. In the East, the hydraulic connection works both ways: in 
the summer, when the water table falls below the level of streams and ponds, some surface 
water percolates through porous bottom sediments to recharge the ground water; in the 
spring and fall, when the water table is high, ground water discharges into streams. [d. at 141. 
In spite of the hydraulic connection and interdependence of ground water and surface streams, 
the law has classified them as two distinct forms of water, to which different rules apply. For a 
general discussion of the legal classification of water and its unscientific effects, see 1 WATERS 
AND WATER RIGHTS § 3.1 (R. Clark, ed. 1967). The rules for surface streams are discussed infra 
note 127. 
37. Michael H. Frimpter, Ground Water For Management 1, 5 (1981) (unpublished paperfor 
Conference on Ground Water Use Management in the North Eastern States: Legal and Insti-
tutional Issues, Cornell University Center for Environmental Research). 
38. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 232-33 (1973) [herein-
after cited as WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE]' 
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above the national average.39 Approximately one-half of this water is 
directly returned to the atmosphere by evaporation and transpira-
tion,40 another fourteen to twenty inches percolates into the ground 
to recharge the ground water supply, and the remainder flows as 
run-off into streams and ponds.41 
In Massachusetts, ground water which occurs in sufficient quanti-
ties for human use is found in both bedrock aquifers and unconsoli-
dated glacial deposits of sand and gravel. Most bedrock aquifers are 
quite small and yield only enough water to provide private domestic 
supply.42 These aquifers are found in fractures and faults in granite 
and other crystalline rock.43 In contrast to these low-yield bedrock 
aquifers are limestone formations in the Berkshire Mountains of 
western Massachusetts which can provide water for municipal sup-
plies and other large-scale users.44 In addition, aquifers in porous 
sandstone in the Connecticut River Valley in west-central Massachu-
setts transmit water in moderate quantities.45 Although the water is 
not of drinkable quality, industrial wells do tap this supply. 46 
In the densely populated eastern part of the state47 the only aqui-
fers capable of yielding sufficient water for municipal water supply 
are found in stratified, or well-sorted, glacial deposits of sand and 
gravel. 48 There are two kinds of stratified glacial deposits. In most of 
eastern Massachusetts the deposits are confined to areas where 
streams from retreating glaciers deposited sand and gravel in pre-
glacial valleys. Such buried valley aquifers are usually less than 100 
feet thick and no more than one or two miles wide.49 Without con-
39. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 36, § 2.5, at 15. 
The average annual rate of precipitation for the 48 coterminous states is 30 inches per year. 1 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36, § 2.5, at 15. 
40. Transpiration is the use of water by plants which returns water to the atmosphere by 
evaporation from leaves. R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 43. 
41. Conversation'with Dr. Michael H. Frimpter, supra note 6. 
42. MASSACHUSETTS WATER SUPPLY POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 138. The yield is 
usually less than 25 gallons per minute (gpm). Id. 
43.Id. 
44. Id. (Some yields are in excess of 1000 gpm). 
45. Id. (Yields range from less than 50 gpm to several hundred gpm). 
46. Conversation with Dr. Michael H. Frimpter, supra note 6. 
47. According to the 1980 census, the total population of Massachusetts was over 5.7 
million, with nearly half, 2.8 million, concentrated in the Boston Metropolitan area. WORLD 
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 618 (H. Lane, ed. 1981). 
48. MASSACHUSETTS WATER SUPPLY POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 137. 
49. UNITED STATES GEOLOGIC SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS, OPEN FILE 
REPORT 90-431, DISTRIBUTION OF AQUIFERS, LIQUID WASTE IMPOUNDMENTS AND MUNICIPAL 
WATER SUPPLY SOURCES, MASSACHUSETTS 1-5 (1980). Some unstratified glacial deposits, called 
till, may yield small quantities of ground water, enough for domestic water supply. Id. 
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stant recharge from surrounding areas, these shallow aquifers would 
be rapidly depleted when utilized by municipalities. 50 In contrast to 
these small glacial deposit aquifers are the extensive glacial deposit 
aquifers of the coastal region, extending along the Atlantic coast 
from Plymouth to Cape Cod and including the islands of Martha's 
Vineyard and Nantucket.51 The entire region is underlain by broad 
sand and gravel deposits several hundred feet thick,52 which are 
capable of development as major water supply aquifers. 58 
In summary, the availability of ground water in Massachusetts is 
limited by the geology of the area. In a large part of the Common-
wealth, where the greatest concentration of population is found, the 
resource is limited by either the low yield or small size of aquifers. 
Furthermore, since the region's aquifers are generally shallow, 
ground water occurs near the surface and is closely connected to sur-
face streams and ponds. Therefore, significant withdrawals of 
ground water are likely both to affect other uses of the same aquifer 
and to reduce the amount of water available to replenish streams and 
ponds. These effects and other problems associated with ground 
water use are described in greater detail below. 
III. GROUND WATER PROBLEMS 
The withdrawal of ground water for use54 as water supply or for 
some other purpose can have significant effects on other water 
users, on other landowners, and on the overall hydrologic cycle. This 
section briefly describes problems of well interference and overdraft 
from an aquifer, and also considers ground water pollution and the 
legislative response to some of the problems. 
A. Well Interference 
When ground water is withdrawn from an aquifer for use, it is 
either pumped from a well or from a filter gallery excavated where 
the water table is close to the land surface. 55 The more common 
50. Conversation with Dr. Michael H. Frimpter, supra note 6. 
51. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 4. 
52. [d. 
53. MASSACHUSETTS WATER SUPPLY POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 138, Map 5-4. 
54. Water uses are often classified as consumptive or nonconsumptive. A consumptive use 
is one which significantly reduces the amount or quality of water in a water source. Domestic 
and municipal uses of water can be nonconsumptive if wastewater is treated properly and 
returned to the original source. [d. at 18. 
55. Filter galleries are channels excavated in an area of high water table, usually near a 
river, into which ground water percolates. They were a common means of water withdrawal in 
the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Aetna Mills v. Inhabitants of Waltham, 126 Mass. 422, 423 
(1879). 
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method, pumping, draws down the water table around the well, 
creating a cone-shaped depression. 56 This effect on the water table, 
called the cone of depression, may extend from several feet to 
several miles in diameter, depending on the strength of the pump 
and hydrologic conditions. 57 When two wells are so close together 
that their cones of depression overlap, well interference occurs, and 
the water table is drawn down even further. 58 As a result, both wells 
must pump water a greater distance. The well in the better hydro-
logic position or with the stronger pump may even draw the water 
table down below the reach of the other well. 59 To compensate for 
well interference, the injured water user can deepen his well as far as 
is economically practical, but the bigger pump may succeed in 
monopolizing the supply. In addition, unregulated physical competi-
tion among ground water users encourages each pumper to pump ex-
cessively in order to prevent others from lowering the water table 
FIGURE 2 
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Cones of Depression' 
• (H. BALDWIN and C. MCGUINNESS, A PRIMER ON GROUND WATER 21 (1963» 
56. Baldwin and McGuinness, supra note 25, at 15. 
57. Hydrologic conditions include the permeability of the aquifer, its depth, and the slope of 
the water table. In Massachusetts, the maximum cone of depression of a high yield well is 
usually less than 100 feet in diameter. Conversation with Roger Rondeau, Assistant Director, 
Water Supply Division, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering 
(Feb. 16, 1982). 
58. Baldwin and McGuinness, supra note 25, at 15. See Figure 2. Well interference may be 
caused by other activities besides pumping ground water for water supply. For example, 
pumping water from a mine may lower the water table and interfere with wells. See infra text 
at note 264. Excavation and draining land for construction may also cause well interference. 
See infra text at notes 212-217. 
59. Baldwin and McGuinness, supra note 25, at 15. 
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first.60 This kind of competition is an example of the "common pool 
problem" and is analogous to oil and gas exploitation problems.61 
Well interference is a central problem in ground water law, since a 
pumper's ability to tap the water supply is strictly limited by the 
depth of the water table and the reach of the well. Interference 
creates an apparent scarcity of water for affected pumpers and pro-
motes strategies of pumping which further tends to lower the water 
table throughout a ground water basin. 
B. Over-Pumping from an Aquifer 
In addition to the phenomenon of well interference, ground water 
withdrawal may cause other substantial side effects, increasing the 
costs of utilizing an aquifer. Four problems which may result from 
excessive pumping are ground water mining, salt water intrusion, 
depletion of streams and ponds, and land subsidence. 
Ground water mining occurs when ground water is withdrawn 
from an aquifer faster than it is being replenished, causing a region-
wide lowering of the water table.62 The effect occurs when wells tap 
ground water which has been stored over many years and recharge 
takes place so slowly that the water is not replaced.63 Ground water 
FIGURE 3 
Fresh Water-Salt Water Interface* 
* (GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSgTTS 14 (1979» 
60. J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN, AND J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOL· 
OGY, AND POLICY 59-61 (1960) [hereinafter cited as J. HIRSHLEIFER]. 
61. Id. For a comparison of ground water development with oil and gas exploitation, see 
Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 855, 857 (1971). For common pool problems generally, see Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1963). 
62. R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 176. 
63.Id. 
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mining is a common phenomenon in large western aquifers, where 
storage greatly exceeds the annual rate of recharge.64 Because the 
shallow aquifers in Massachusetts have little storage potential 
beyond the annual rate of recharge, they can provide water supply 
without great susceptibility to ground water mining. 65 If water with-
drawals from these aquifers exceed recharge, wells are eventually 
exhausted.66 In a time of drought, recharge is reduced and exhaus-
tion becomes accelerated. 
A serious problem caused by over-pumping in this region is that of 
salt water intrusion.67 Normally, fresh water in coastal aquifers 
floats in a lens on top of the heavier salt water which percolates into 
the aquifers from the ocean.68 Large withdrawals of fresh water in-
duce salt water to flow further inland and replace fresh water in the 
aquifer.69 Salt water intrusion is an irreversible effect and poses a 
threat to fresh water supplies in the coastal region. 70 Wells in 
Provincetown on Cape Cod for example, have been abandoned as a 
result of this form of contamination. 71 
Ground water pumping can also affect surface water by diverting 
water away from ponds, streams, and rivers.72 This effect can occur 
in one of two ways. First, a well may intercept ground water which 
would otherwise have discharged into a stream or other surface 
water.73 Second, pumping may draw water out of the stream and in-
to an aquifer through the process of induced infiltration.74 That is, 
pumping may lower the water table in the area of the stream, stimu-
lating the flow of surface water through porous sediments in the 
stream bed and into the ground.75 Severe depletion of surface water 
caused by ground water withdrawals has been documented in sev-
eral river basins in Massachusetts.76 Ponds and lakes have also been 
64. Id. at 177-78. 
65. Conversation with Dr. Michael H. Frimpter, supra note 6. 
66.Id. 
67. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 14. 
68. See Figure 3. 
69. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 14. 
70. Since salt water is heavier, it cannot be displaced by fresh water. Id. 
71. Id. at 36. See Figure 4. 
72. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 12. 
73.Id. 
74. Id. See Figure 5. 
75.Id. 
76. Id. at 26-29. River basins which have been affected include the Ipswich, Neponset, and 
Aberjona River basins. The inverse problem arises when diversion from a stream or river 
reduces recharge to ground water and affects wells. See Davis, Wells and Streams: Relation· 
ship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REV. 189, 215 (1972). 
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lowered by excessive pumping.77 For example, the United States 
Geological Survey established that pumping from municipal wells in 
the 1960s caused the Kingbury Pond in southeastern Massachusetts 
to shrink from twenty-six to nine acres, with a thirteen foot drop in 
vertical water level. 78 
Besides affecting ground water and surface water levels, excessive 
pumping from wells may incidentally affect land by causing surface 
subsidence. 79 Subsidence occurs when mineral grains in an aquifer 
become compacted after the water between them has been re-
moved.80 This phenomenon has been known to cause a lowering of 
land elevation by as much as ten feet. 81 Subsidence also occurs when 
FIGURE 4 
Discharge of Groundwater to Surface Water 
FIGURE 5 
Induced Infiltration From Surface Water to Groundwater" 
" (GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS 12 (191'9)) 
77. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 30-32. Ex-
amples are Lake Quinsigamond and Kingbury Pond. Id. 
78. Id. at 31-32. The change occurred between 1964 and 1967. The situation was problem-
atic because the wells were in one town, the pond in another. A suit to enjoin the town of 
Franklin from pumping excessively was dismissed on the basis of the absolute ownership doc-
trine. Id. at 32. 
79. R. KAZMANN, supra note 20, at 195. 
80.Id. 
8l. Kazmann reports that in the San Joaquin Valley in California, land elevations have de-
clined from four to ten feet due to ground water withdrawals. Id. 
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withdrawals of water from limestone formations leave sinkholes.82 
In addition to damage to surface structures and roads, subsidence 
has important subsurface effects, namely, the impairment of an aqui-
fer's ability to transmit water.83 Subsidence is a major problem in 
some parts of the country,84 but is of minor local significance in Mas-
sachusetts.85 
C. Ground Water Pollution and Urbanization 
With increasing urbanization and industrialization new problems 
relating to ground water quality and ground water recharge have 
arisen. Ground water is susceptible to degradation from many 
sources. In heavily urbanized eastern Massachusetts, for example, 
ground water supplies have been impaired or destroyed through im-
proper disposal of chemical waste,86 infiltration of dissolved road 
salt,87 improper gasoline storage,88 and leaching from landfills and 
sewage systems.89 Because of the slow movement of ground water, 
pollutants remain in an aquifer long after initial contamination, so 
that this threat to water supply may in the long run be more serious 
than surface water pollution.90 Since most aquifers in Massachusetts 
are shallow and not far below the land surface, threats to ground 
water quality from the surface are especially problematic. In addi-
tion, since ground water and surface water are closely related, the 
contamination of one often leads to the degradation of the other 
within the same hydrologic basin.91 
Urbanization has other effects on ground water besides contami-
nation. Paved surfaces increase surface run-off into streams and re-
duce the amount of water available to recharge aquifers.92 In addi-
82. See, e.g., Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 388 So.2d 900 (Ala. 1980). 
83. R. KAzMANN, supra note 20 at 195. 
84. [d. 
85. See, e.g., Gamer v. Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1958). 
86. See CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION: WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE, supra note 14. The towns 
of Acton, Woburn, and Bedford have lost significant portions of their water supply because of 
the improper disposal of toxic organic solvents which leached into the ground water. [d. For a 
general discussion of ground water pollution, see Tripp and Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater 
Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARV. 
ENVT'L L. REV. 1 (1979). 
87. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 38-39. 
The town of Weston, for example, lost all of its water supply due to improper storage of high-
way de-icing salt. [d. 
88. CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION: WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 25, 28. 
89. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 40-54. 
90. Tripp and Jaffe, supra note 86, at 4. 
91. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 62. 
92. [d. 
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tion, sewage systems often remove water from a local area for treat-
ment at a centralized plant and eventual discharge into a distant 
river or the ocean. Such systems, in contrast to subsurface sewage 
disposal, reduce the amount of water available to aquifers.93 In parts 
of eastern Massachusetts the combined effects of paving and sewer-
age service have lowered the water table and reduced water 
supply.94 These incidents of urbanization affect not only wells but 
also stream levels, because the natural discharge of ground water in-
to surface water is reduced.95 
D. The Legislative Response 
The Massachusetts legislature has made efforts to address several 
ground water problems. The Wetlands Protection Act,96 enacted in 
1967, protects ground water recharge and water quality by regulat-
ing development in wetlands. The Massachusetts Clean Water Act97 
prohibits the discharge of pollutants from point sources98 or major 
. non-point sources99 into ground water without a permit. The Act also 
requires service stations and motor oil retailers to store used oil 
according to certain specifications in order to prevent contamination 
of ground water.100 In addition, subsurface sewage disposal sys-
temslOl and landfillsl02 are regulated under the State Environmental 
Code in order to prevent pollutants from leaching into ground water 
supplies. 
In contrast to the legislation aimed at preventing ground water 
pollution, there is little regulation of ground water pumping in Mas-
sachusetts. Unlike many other states which require permits for new 
wells,103 well drilling is directly regulated only by a statute requiring 
that contractors be registered with the state and file a report at the 
93. Id. at 29. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1974). 
97. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, §§ 42-46 (West 1979). 
98. Point sources are pipes, sewer outfalls, injection wells, and drains, from which waste 
water or pollutants are discharged directly into the environment. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
21, § 26A (West 1979). 
99. Non-point sources include dumps, subsurface sewage disposal systems, chemically ferti-
lized fields, and waste disposal lagoons. Pollutants from these sources do not enter the envi-
ronment at a single point. Id. 
100. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 16 (West 1979). 
101. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 17,31, and 127A (West Supp. 1981). 
102. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150A (West Supp. 1981). 
103. Most western states have enacted well permit programs. 5 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS, S 442 (R. Clark ed. 1972). Many eastern states have also enacted well permitting legis-
lation. 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 619.1 (R. Clark ed. 1976). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 373, 
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conclusion of a drilling operation.104 Indirectly, well drilling and 
pumping for municipal water supply are regulated by a statute re-
quiring a municipality or private water company to obtain the "ad-
vice and approval" of the Massachusetts Department of Environ-
mental Quality Engineering (DEQE) before acquiring a source of 
public water supply106 or land to protect water supply.106 The DEQE, 
which has oversight over all the waters of the Commonwealth,107 
must approve the location and arrangement of all wells, filter galler-
ies, and filtration and pumping plants. lOB When a town acquires land 
for ground water development, regulations issued by the DEQE re-
quire the town to acquire "sufficient land around wells, infiltration 
galleries, springs, and similar sources of ground water to protect the 
water from contamination."109 Although the intent of the statute 
and regulations appears to be the protection of ground water from 
bacterial or other contamination, the DEQE has exercised its ap-
proval authority in a few cases to allocate ground water between 
competing public users.ll0 In these instances, the DEQE has speci-
fied minimum distances between the wells of two towns and limited 
pumping rates based on their relative population. ll1 In other cases, 
the DEQE has denied permission for towns to pump ground water 
from aquifers associated with rivers already suffering from low 
flOWS. 112 Such administrative allocations are contrary to the doctrine 
of absolute ownership and may be in excess of statutory authority, 
but they have not yet been challenged by litigation. 
The final area of legislative enactment aimed at protecting ground 
water and regulating its use has been the authorization of studies of 
the problem. The Massachusetts Water Resources Commission, in 
303-339 (West 1974); GA. CODE ANN. ch. 17, §§ 1101-1115 (Harrison Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. 
STAT. 151.010-.990 (Bobbs Merrill 1980); N.Y. ENVIRON. CONSERV. L. §§ 15-1501 to 15-1527 
(West 1977). For a comparison of some regulatory programs, see J. SAX, supra note 32, at 
463-64. See also WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 38, at 280-93 (model permit 
system for eastern states). See generally Clarke, The Role of State Legislation in Ground 
Water Management, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 469 (1977). 
104. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 16 (West 1979). 
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 39B (West 1979). 
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 41 (West 1977). 
107. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 5, 17 (West Supp. 1981). 
108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, §§ 39B, 41 (West 1979). 
109. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 22.21 (West 1979). 
110. Conversation with Roger Rondeau, supra note 57. 
111. Id. An example is the allocation of the Minebrook Valley aquifer between the towns of 
Walpole and Medfield. Id. 
112. GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 13, at 22 (re-
ferring to the Charles River Basin). 
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cooperation with the United States Geological Survey has under-
taken a long-term ground water survey with the object of assessing 
aquifers, determining how to protect existing sources of ground 
water, and identifying new sources of supply.ns 
So far, legislative efforts in Massachusetts have been aimed at pro-
tecting ground water resources and managing them for public use, 
but they do not address the central problem of ground water 
law-how to allocate water supplies among different users.n4 Nor 
has the legislature addressed the issue of such social costs of over-
pumping as salt water intrusion and depletion of surface streams. In 
Massachusetts, as in most eastern states, allocation problems are 
generally addressed by the courts, not by the legislature or adminis-
trative agencies. Incidental effects of ground water use and other 
forms of well interference are also treated under judicial doctrines of 
ground water rights. To resolve ground water disputes effectively, a 
ground water doctrine should provide the courts with adequate tools 
for allocating this resource when there is either a real shortage or an 
apparent one created by well interference. It should also supply the 
means for restraining ground water uses which harm water re-
sources. 
IV. CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING GROUND WATER DOCTRINES 
A survey of the literature on ground water laws shows that com-
mentators have identified several factors for evaluating a system of 
ground water rights. 115 Of these criteria, five are most commonly 
used to analyze judicial rules. 116 A rational ground water doctrine 
should: (1) protect rights to the use of a resource which is held in 
113. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 8A (West 1979). 
114. This is true except to the extent that the DEQE has interpreted its statutory authority 
to administer de facto allocations between municipalities at the time they acquire land for 
water supply. See supra text and notes at notes 110-11. 
115. Hanks and Hanks, The Law of Water In New Jersey: Groundwater, 24 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 621 (1970); Harnsberger, Oeltjen, and Fischer, Groundwater: From Windmills to Com-
prehensive Public Management, 52 NEB. L. REV. 179 (1972); J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60; 
Lowe, Ruedisili, and Graham, Beyond Section 858: A Proposed Ground Water Liability and 
Management System for the Eastern United States, 8 ECOLOGY L. Q. 131 (1979); Maloney and 
Plager, Florida's Ground Water: Legal Problems in Managing a Precious Resource, 21 U. OF 
MIAMI L. REV. 751 (1967); Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic 
Forces and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1965); WATER POLICIES FOR THE 
FUTURE, supra note 38, at 234-45; Weston and Gang, Law of Ground Water in Pennsylvania, 
81 DICK. L. REV. 11 (1978). 
116. For a list of similar objectives, including several other criteria for evaluating legislative 
solutions to water allocation problems, see Weston and Gang, supra note 115, at 45-62. 
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common; (2) correspond to hydrological knowledge of ground water 
movement; (3) encourage the maximum beneficial use of ground 
water; (4) promote public interests by providing water supply for all 
and protecting the environmental and recreational values of water 
resources; and (5) provide courts with tools for making fair alloca-
tions of a finite resource. These five criteria can provide the founda-
tion for a new system of ground water rights in Massachusetts. 
A. Protection of Usufructuary Rights117 
As with other natural resources, the development and use of 
ground water are encouraged by assigning property rights118 in this 
resource to individuals. 119 These rights should not be proprietary 
rights in the water in an aquifer, however, but usufructuary rights to 
the control and use of the water .120 Usufructuary rights have advan-
tages over ownership rights. First, ground water, like air and sur-
face water, is a resource which is held in common.121 It is illogical to 
assign ownership rights in a fugitive resource such as ground water 
which cannot be contained within boundaries, and by its nature 
moves from place to place. Since ground water cannot be divided in-
to discrete portions while in its natural state, possessory rights can 
only attach after it has been withdrawn from an aquifer .122 Second, 
usufructuary rights avoid the "taking" problem potentially created 
when regulatory legislation limits a landowner's rights to withdraw 
water. If the prevailing legal scheme vests actual ownership of 
ground water instead of protecting rights to the use of water, regula-
tion of ground water withdrawal may raise constitutional prob-
lems.123 By defining the rights as usufructuary, the constitutional 
issue does not arise. 
117. Usufructuary rights are property rights to the use of resources, in contrast to proprie-
tary rights, which are rights of ownership. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 641. 
118. While judicial doctrines for ground water allocation create property interests, theyac-
tually operate as tort rules for determining liability for certain kinds of interference with 
water use. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 182 introductory note to chapter 41 (1977). 
119. [d. at 216 Scope Note for § 850. 
120. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 641. 
121. Wiel, Natural Communism: Air, Water, Oil, Sea and Seashore, 47 HARV. L. REV. 425, 
439 (1934). 
122. J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 232. 
123. R. POWELL, 5 REAL PROPERTY § 728, at 431 (1981). Decisions in several states have 
struck down water conservation legislation as contrary to vested property rights in ground 
water and unconstitutional under due process guarantees. See, e.g., Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 
355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903). Regulatory legislation in other states has been upheld despite con-
trary ground water doctrine. See, e.g., Eccles v. Ditto, 23 N.M. 235,167 P. 726 (1917). Recent 
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B. Recognition of Hydrological Relationships 
A system of ground water rights should be based on scientific 
knowledge of the hydrologic cycle and the effects of ground water 
withdrawals on the water table and other water users. In the past, 
this knowledge was not available.124 Today, however, courts have 
recognized that advances in hydrology allow scientists to establish a 
cause and effect relationship between ground water pumping and 
the level of the water table in an area.12S The interconnection be-
tween two wells can be shown, and when causality is established, 
liability can be fairly adjudicated. Thus, a modern ground water doc-
trine based on hydrological principles can protect a landowner from 
well interference which prevents him from exercising his usufruc-
tuary rights. 
Further, courts have acknowledged that science demonstrates the 
crucial interdependence of all water systems.126 A ground water doc-
trine should take account of the interdependence of surface water 
and ground water. The doctrine should complement the surface 
water law in the jurisdiction-in Massachusetts, the doctrine of 
riparian rights.127 Only then can the courts resolve disputes between 
well owners and owners of land adjacent to streams and rivers. 
Where the two systems of water rights are incompatible, treating 
developments in the law of "takings," striking a balance between a valid exercise of police 
power and diminution of property value, may now make the problem moot. See, e.g., Turnpike 
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972). 
124. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36, § 619.1, at 159. 
125. See, e.g., State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc., 63 Wis.2d 278, 292, 217 N.W.2d 
339,345 (1974). 
126. [d. 
127. In Massachusetts and other eastern states, rights in surface streams are governed by 
the doctrine of riparian rights. In the west, the system of prior appropriation governs the use 
of surface streams. See infra text and notes at notes 168-73. According to the riparian theory 
of reasonable use, each owner of land adjacent to a stream has the right to the reasonable use 
of the water, including reasonable withdrawals for water supply, irrigation, and other uses. 
MASSACHUSETTS WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, COMPILATION AND SUMMARIZATION OF MASSA-
CHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS, SPECIAL LAWS, AND PERTINENT COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO 
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MASSACHUSETTS WATER RESOURCES 
COMMISSION REPORT]. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mt. Herman Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83,103 N.E. 
87 (1913); Mason v. Whitney, 193 Mass. 152, 78 N.E. 881 (1906). A riparian owner's rights are 
limited by the equal and correlative rights of other land owners who use the same water 
source; no owner may unreasonably interfere with another's lawful use. See, e.g., Armory v. 
Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947). See generally Haar and Gordon, 
Riparian Water Rights vs. A Prior Appropriation System: A Comparison, 38 B.U. L. REV. 
207 (1958). Because the riparian doctrine does not cross the boundary between different 
classes of water, it does not expressly protect a riparian owner from excessive ground water 
withdrawals which reduce surface water levels. 
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water users differently depending on their source of water supply, 
the law may provide no remedy for riparian owners who are harmed 
by excessive pumping.128 Likewise, well owners may have no relief 
for excessive stream diversions which affect the water table. Inte-
grating ground water and surface water doctrines into a unified 
system of water rights should be a primary objective of modern 
water law. 129 
c. Encouragement of Maximum Beneficial Use 
Another major goal of water law should be the encouragement of 
maximum beneficial use of a finite resource.130 In order to accom-
plish this goal, a system of ground water rights should create in-
terests which are secure enough to encourage the development of 
ground water and to allow for transfer of rights to more beneficial 
uses.13l Security in water rights is measured by duration in time; a 
secure right is one which is reasonably safe from premature termina-
tion without compensation.132 Where rights are insecure, the devel-
opment of ground water is discouraged because investments in land 
and equipment cannot be safeguarded.133 
A ground water doctrine should also provide secure water rights in 
order to avoid common pool problems.134 Where users are unsure of 
holding onto their rights, landowners who do risk investment in 
ground water are likely to engage in well races to obtain as much of 
the supply as they can regardless of the cost to others.135 This activi-
ty can lead to the inefficient use of water, since it may be wasted or 
used up prematurely.136 An efficient ground water doctrine makes 
water rights secure by penalizing a pumper who causes well interfer-
ence for limiting or terminating another's use of the common supply. 
Although ground water law should provide security for water 
rights, legal protection should not result in freezing the pattern of 
128. See the Kingbury Pond problem discussed supra text and notes at note 78. 
129. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 38, at 232-33. According to the authors, 
the coordinated management of ground water and surface water resources is a primary prob-
lem of water law. 
130. Trelease, supra note 115, at 2. 
131. ld. 
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 858, at 233. 
133. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36, § 3.2, at 414-20. For a thorough 
economic analysis of water law, see 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36, §§ 60-63. See 
also J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 222-54; Trelease, supra note 115, at 2-7. 
134. See supra text and notes at notes 60-61. 
135. J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 59-61. 
136. ld. at 60. 
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ground water use, because needs change and greater economic and 
social benefit may be obtained from different uses. 137 An efficient 
system of law should provide flexibility so that ground water can be 
utilized most beneficially.13B Some flexibility is provided by a system 
of ground water rights based on land ownership, since land overlying 
an aquifer can be purchased or taken by eminent domain for water 
supply. Another means of encouraging flexibility is by making water 
rights secure enough so that they can be easily transferred in a 
market system.139 
D. Responsiveness to Public Needs 
Judicial rules resolve conflicts between parties; they cannot direct-
ly manage water resources to promote public welfare. Indirectly, 
however, judicial doctrines have promoted the primary goal of pro-
viding optimum water use for all people. For example, in riparian 
law140 an absolute preference for domestic use has been recognized 
in times of water shortage.141 Similarly, judicial rules prohibiting 
waste or malicious use of ground water also protect public interests 
in water supply.142 Although water law is based on private property 
rights, public needs for water supply are not frustrated since the 
public can purchase water rights like any other participant in the 
market by purchasing land overlying a water supply, for example. 143 
Some public interests in water, however, lie outside the market.144 
These interests include protection of supplies for future use and for 
recreation, and the promotion of environmental values of water such 
as wildlife habitat, fisheries, and aesthetics.145 Most of these public 
values are dependent on minimum surface water flows. 1415 One goal 
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 850A, at 235. 
138. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36, § 63.1, at 412. 
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 858, at 259. For an argument ad-
vocating a pure market system of water allocation, see J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 
234-43. For a view advocating greater public control over water alloeation, see Clark, Arizona 
Ground Water Law: The Needfor Legislation, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (1974). 
140. See supra note 127. 
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 850, at 223. 
142. See infra text and note at note 186 (prohibition against malicious use); text and note at 
note 257 (prohibition against waste). 
143. J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 234. The authors assert that allowing the public to 
preempt private rights in water without compensation does not promote efficient use of water. 
144. Trelease, supra note 115, at 40-41. 
145. These interests are outside the market system either because they have no dollar value 
or because the interests are so widely held that individuals have little incentive to protect them 
legally.ld. 
146. Id. 
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of a modern system of water law, then, is to protect aquifers from 
degradation; another is to protect minimum stream flows and pond 
levels in order to preserve recreational and environmental values.147 
A ground water doctrine which is compatible with surface water 
rights would enable private landowners to seek judicial enforcement 
of private rights to minimum stream flows in the event of excessive 
ground water withdrawals. In addition, the public rights in streams 
and ponds might be safeguarded against excessive pumping under 
the public trust doctrine. 148 This doctrine, which has been developed 
in Massachusetts149 and several other states,150 provides that certain 
lands and resources are held by the state in trust for the benefit of all 
citizens.151 The doctrine imposes a duty on the state to protect 
resources held in trust from the harmful effects of incompatible 
private or public use.152 In many jurisdictions, navigable rivers are 
held to be public resources accessible for transportation, fishing, and 
other uses.153 Therefore, the attorney general or other representa-
tive of the public interest could enforce public rights when excessive 
ground water pumping diverts water away from protected surface 
water resources, as long as surface water and ground water doc-
trines are compatible.154 
147. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 38, at 287. 
148. The public trust doctrine has been suggested as a means for public enforcement of en-
vironmental rights and for judicial review of administrative regulation of resou:-ces. For a 
general discussion of the doctrine, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). For a discussion of the doctrine's application in water use 
cases, see Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 233 (1981). 
149. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 
(1966). 
150. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
151. In Massachusetts, since passage of the Colony Ordinances of 1641 and 1649, the Com-
monwealth has held navigable tidal rivers and great ponds (those larger than 10 acres) in trust 
for public use. MASSACHUSETTS WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 127, at 17, 
24. For a discussion of the Ordinances and the rights created by them, see Slater v. Gunn, 170 
Mass. 509, 49 N.E. 1017 (1898). See generally Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance: Collectivism 
in Northern New England, 30 B.U. L. REV. (1950); Wiel, supra note 121. In addition, 
Massachusetts courts recognize a public transportation easement in inland navigable rivers, 
which may be protected under the public trust. MASSACHUSETTS WATER RESOURCES COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 127, at 21. 
152. Encroachments on public rights in Massachusetts waters may be abated. See, e.g., 
Weinstein v. Lake Pearl Park, Inc., 347 Mass. 98, 196 N.E.2d 638 (1964) (encroachment by 
private developer); Sacco v. Dep't of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967) (en-
croachment by state agency). 
153. Johnson, supra note 148, at 248-52. 
154. For an argument urging the imposition of a public trust on ground water itself, see 
Lowe, supra note 115, at 144-46. 
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E. Fairness 
A rational system of ground water rights should give courts tools 
for fairly adjudicating claims between users competing for the same 
source of supply. 155 Disputes arise when an aquifer cannot yield 
enough water to supply all uses because of well interferenc:e or water 
shortage. In either situation, the court must decide who shall bear 
the loss of water supply: in a case of well interference, whether to im-
pose costs on a user causing an interference; in a case of shortage, 
whether to spread costs among all users. 
The determination of fairness in allocating resources depends on 
social and political values.156 Technology has increased the need for 
judicial intervention to resolve these disputes. Until the late nine-
teenth century wells were hand-dug, hand-pumped, and unlikely to 
have a profound effect on the water table.157 With the change in 
technology to deep well drilling and mechanically and electrically 
powered pumps, wells became capable of withdrawing mueh greater 
amounts of water, having potentially drastic effects on the water 
table and on neighboring well owners.158 As a eonsequence, small 
well owners are now at a great disadvantage in competing with 
municipal water commissions, industrial pumpers, and other large-
scale ground water consumers. 
Protecting domestic water supply and other small-scale uses from 
the adverse effects of large ground water withdrawals can result in a 
balance which appears socially and politically fair. Although the judi-
cial readjustment may seem to occur at the expense of economic effi-
ciency,159 the usual solution is not to prohibit the interfering more 
valuable use outright, but to require it to pay for the costs of its 
operation by compensating an injured neighbor or by providing an 
alternative water supply.160 What appears to be :a fair allocation of 
water or distribution of costs ultimately depends on the circum-
stances of each case. Nonetheless, a satisfactory system of water 
rights will provide principles necessary to evaluate the facts of the 
case and to ensure an equitable balancing of interests. Two princi-
ples which should be adopted are that one who profits from the devel-
opment of a resource should bear the costs of development;161 and 
155. See generally J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 74-86. 
156. Weston and Gang, supra note 115, at 58. 
157. Clark, supra note 139, at 801-02. 
158. [d. 
159. Weston and Gang, supra note 115, at 58. 
160. [d. at 59. 
161. See, e.g., Tucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 284 N.E.2d 1195 (1978), discussed infra 
text and notes at notes 232-36. 
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that if development is for the public benefit, costs should be spread 
among all the beneficiaries.162 
In summary, a rational system of water law should secure usufruc-
tuary rights in ground water, imposing liability for interference with 
those rights when causation can be established in hydrological terms 
and when the protection of such rights is necessary to promote the 
maximum beneficial use of ground water or the social objective of 
fairness. In addition, the system should provide some means for pro-
tecting public interests as well as private rights. A judicial doctrine 
for ground water rights which reasonably satisfies the five criteria 
set forth above can effectively resolve conflicts which are likely to 
arise as competition for ground water increases in Massachusetts. In 
the following section these criteria will be applied in a critical 
analysis of the current ground water doctrine in the context of three 
alternative judicial approaches to ground water rights. 
v. JUDICIAL RULES FOR GROUND WATER ALLOCATION 
Five doctrines for allocating ground water among competing users 
have emerged from American case law: the rule of absolute owner-
ship, the rule of reasonable use, the correlative rights rule, the rule 
of the Restatement of Torts, and the doctrine of prior appropria-
tion.163 The first four doctrines assign rights in ground water to the 
owner of the overlying land.164 The common law doctrines of abso-
lute ownership and reasonable use are applied mainly in the eastern 
half of the country.166 In California, the third approach, the rule of 
correlative rights, was adopted from the eastern common law 
system to solve problems of water scarcity. The California formula-
tion has since been adopted in some eastern jurisdictions.166 The ap-
proach of the Restatement of Torts is also based on the common law 
162. See, e.g., Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 552, 58 N.E. 644 (1903), discussed in-
fra text and notes at notes 259-63. 
163. See generally Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115; Davis, supra note 76; Maloney and 
Plager, supra note 115; Weston and Gang, supra note 115; Harnsberger, supra note 115; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, at 244-48 introductory note for § 858. Cases 
are reported by jurisdiction in 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 103, § 619.1, at 157 
n.70. 
164. For a critical comparison of the common law rules, see Hanks and Hanks, supra note 
115, at 630-48. Distinctions among the rules are not always as clear as theoretical analysis sug-
gests, and courts confuse the doctrines. J. SAX, supra note 32, at 463. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-
Ark-Val Poultry Co., 22u Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 11 (1957). 
165. 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 103, § 619.1. 
166. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 643. 
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system of water rights, incorporating features of the California doc-
trine and the riparian doctrine of surface water rights.167 
The fifth system, the western doctrine of prior appropriation, must 
be mentioned, although it will not be considered as a rule for Massa-
chusetts because this approach is completely distinct from the com-
mon law water doctrines.168 Under the prior appropriation system, 
rights in water are not an incident of land ownership but are ac-
quired by diverting water from its source and putting it to beneficial 
use, often on some distant land.169 The system protects the rights of 
the earliest user, or appropriator, from interference by all later 
users.170 During a drought, each succeeding user has priority over 
appropriators following him, and his right is subject to the superior 
claims of appropriators who preceded him.171 This rule of "first in 
time is first in right" apparently was derived from Spanish law and 
was initially applied to surface water in the arid regions of the 
west.172 It has been extended to ground water by legislative enact-
ment in a number of western states.173 
Since the prior appropriation system is so different from the com-
mon law approaches to both ground water and surface water alloca-
tion, it is unlikely to be adopted as a ground water rule by the judi-
ciary in an eastern jurisdiction. Rather than make a sweeping 
change from a system of theoretically equal rights to use ground 
water to one of unequal rights based on the order of initiating use, an 
eastern court would more likely adopt the riparian system of reason-
able shares.174 If the prior appropriation system were adopted, 
perhaps by legislation, the change should encompass both surface 
167. See infra text and note at note 331. 
168. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36, §§ 18, 19. The prior appropriation 
system creates secure rights where water is scarce. Such a system of water rights is necessary 
in the west, where land development is limited by the availability of water. Seventeen arid and 
semiarid states now apply the doctrine to surface water rights. In some states on the border of 
the region, such as California and Kansas, riparian rights and appropriative rights coexist. 5 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 103, § 401.2. Prior appropriation is gaining a hold in 
the east when needs exceed supply, creating an apparent drought. See supra note 123. See also 
J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 60, at 252-54 (asserting that the prior appropriation system is the 
most rational form of water law). 
169. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36, § 18.1. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. 
172. [d. § 18.2(b). 
173. See generally 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 36. Some statutes attempt to 
integrate the management of ground and surface water. See SAX, supra note 32:, at 460. 
174. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 645. 
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water and ground water in order to allow for 'coordinated manage-
ment of the two water sources.176 
A. The Doctrine of Absolute Ownership 
1. Discussion of the Doctrine 
The absolute ownership rule gives a landowner an unrestricted 
right to all the water underlying his land.176 He may extract all this 
water and all the water within the cone of depression 177 of his well, 
since that water will be drawn into his land and thus become his 
property. Under this doctrine, a landowner may intercept the 
ground water which would otherwise have been available to a neigh-
boring water user and may even monopolize the yield of an aquifer 
without incurring liability. The rule is commonly known as the 
English rule178 and was initially adopted in twenty-eight American 
jurisdictions.179 More than half these states have since modified or 
discarded this rigid doctrine,180 but it is still followed in Massachu-
setts and most New England states.181 
Due to both the rigidity of the doctrine and the historic abundance 
of surface water supplies, there have been relatively few cases in 
Massachusetts which address the issue of ground water rights. 182 
Nevertheless, the existing cases show a trend toward a more pro-
gressive water rights policy. The early case law in Massachusetts 
demonstrates the broad application of the doctrine of absolute own-
175. Legislation regulating ground water uses and incorporating prior appropriation prin-
ciples - such as protecting earlier uses from any infringement by later ones - has been 
enacted in several eastern states, including Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, New Jersey, 
and New York. For a compilation of state statutes, see supra note 103. 
176. Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 620, 195 N.E.2d 65,67 (1958). 
177. See supra text and notes at notes 56-57. 
178. The rule is based on the old English case, Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 67 Rev. 
Rep. 361 (Ex_ 1843). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 186-91. 
179. R. POWELL, supra note 123, § 725, at 419. 
180. Id. at 421. 
181. See, e.g., Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 532 (1850); Chesley v_ King, 74 Me. 164 (1882); 
Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411,173 A. 627 (1934); Drinkwine v. State, 131 Vt. 127, 
300 A.2d 616 (1973). New Hampshire follows a reasonable use rule announced in a flooding 
case, Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 249 (1862). In Massachusetts, the rule of absolute 
ownership was most recently affirmed in Gamer v. Town of Milton, 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E .2d 
65 (1958). The court declared in dicta that "[i]t is, of course, settled in this Commonwealth that 
a landowner has absolute ownership in the subsurface percolating water in his land. He may 
use it as he sees fit, even if this results in a loss of water in his neighbor's land." 346 Mass. at 
621, 195 N.E.2d at 67 (citations omitted). 
182. Most cases are from the nineteenth century. The majority concerns rights of mill 
owners to minimum surface flows. See supra text and note at note 202. 
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ership. Later cases limited the application of the rule in special cir-
cumstances, and more recent decisions have modified the harshness 
of the rule. 
The earliest Massachusetts case to address the issue of ground 
water rights was Greenleafv. Francis. 18s In this case, the defendant 
sank a well near his property line, five feet from the plaintiff's well, 
and caused the plaintiff's well to fail. The court ruled that the 
defendant was not liable for the interference, because a landowner 
has "the absolute dominion of the soil, extending upwards and below 
the surface . . . . He may obstruct the light and air above and cut off 
the springs of water below the surface."184 Interestingly, the court 
in Greenleaf did not base its holding on the landowner's absolute 
ownership of the ground water itself, but merely on his right to dig in 
his land without liability, even though in doing so he drains his neigh-
bor's water supply. 186 The Greenleaf court did impose two limitations 
on a landowner's right to sink wells: he must not act merely from 
malice; and he may not remove the lateral support to a neighbor's 
property. 186 
While the result in Greenleafprotected the landowner over his in-
jured neighbor, it was the English case of Acton v. Blundell187 which 
first articulated the theory of absolute ownership of ground water. 
In that case, which followed Greenleaf by seven years, mill owners 
sued a mine owner who pumped ground water out of his mine, 
thereby diverting water from the stream on which the plaintiffs 
depended for power.188 The Acton court announced that it would 
183. 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 117 (1836). 
184. [d. at 122-23. The phrase "springs of water below the surface" means the percolation 
of ground water into the well. Ground water is a term of recent origin. Older cases refer to 
"springs," "percolating water," or "subterranean currents." The word "springs" is now 
limited in Massachusetts to the issuing forth of water upon the surface. Town of Holliston v. 
Holliston Water Supply Co., 306 Mass. 17, 19,29 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1948). The Greenleafcourt 
rejected the plaintiff's claim of a prescriptive right, obtained by adverse possession, in the 
ground water under the defendant's property. The court reasoned that because the defendant 
could not know that his ground water supplied the plaintiff's well, the plaintiff could not have 
obtained adverse possession. 38 Mass. at 122. Prescriptive rights are a logical impossibility 
under the rule of absolute ownership, since one cannot act adversely toward a right which can-
not be enforced. Weston and Gang, supra note 115, at 29. See infra text and note at note 201. 
185. 38 Mass. at 123. 
186. 38 Mass. at 121. Other absolute ownership jurisdictions also prohibit malicious use. But 
see Wheelock v. Jacobs, 90 Vt. 162, 40 A. 41 (1897) (presence of malice irrelevant). 
187. 12 M. & W. 324, 67 Rev. Rep. 361 (Ex. 1843). 
188. Like many other early ground water cases, Acton v. Blundell was not a conflict be-
tween competing well owners. For a modern view that ground water extraction for purposes 
other than water supply should be governed by nuisance law rather than ground water rights 
doctrine, see Labuzzo v. Atlantic Dredging & Construction Co., 54 So.2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1951). 
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follow the rule "which gives the owner of the soil all that lies beneath 
his surface," including the water in the soil. 189 The opinion goes on to 
say that because the landowner may dig at will and use the water and 
other constituents of his soil as he pleases regardless of harm to a 
neighbor, there is no cause of action for loss of ground water 
supply.190 This is the first statement of the proposition that ground 
water is part of the soil and thus subject to the legal maxim that 
ownership extends from the heavens to the center of the earth.191 
According to this view, ground water is inherently different from 
surface streams, which cannot be owned, and will be treated dif-
ferently by the law.192 
The rule of Acton v. Blundell was first cited with approval in Mas-
sachusetts in Wilson v. City of New Bedford,193 a case concerning lia-
bility for ground water flooding rather than rights to withdraw 
ground water.194 The Wilson court approved the principle that "per-
colating water belongs to the owner of the land as much as the land 
itself or the rocks and stones in it." 196 Therefore, the owner has an 
unlimited right to pump ground water or obstruct its flow. 196 Dictum 
in Wilson has been frequently cited in other jurisdictions for the 
proposition that under the rule of absolute ownership, a landowner's 
use of ground water is not limited to application on his own land, but 
may be distributed to other water users.197 
In addition to Greenleaf, only one other Massachusetts case, Davis 
v. Spaulding,198 concerned well interference by another water user. 
189. 12 M. & W. at 354, 67 Rev. Rep. at 384. 
190. [d. 
191. [d. 
192. See supra note 127 for a discussion of riparian surface water rights. 
193. 108 Mass. 261 (1871). 
194. The defendant city had constructed a reservoir, causing both surface water and ground 
water flooding. The court ordered the city to compensate the plaintiff, whose farmland was 
made useless by ground water flooding, because under the statute authorizing the reservoir, 
the city was required to pay all damages resulting from its construction. 108 Mass. at 265-66. 
195. 108 Mass. at 265. 
196. The court however, imposed liability on the city in this case, because it did not have 
similar unlimited rights to control surface water. Following the rule of strict liability of 
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), the court held the city accountable for artificially 
bringing water onto its land, which water escaped underground and caused harm to other 
landowners. 108 Mass. at 266. The court did not distinguish between surface water flooding 
and ground water flooding caused by the reservoir, even though it acknowledged that "it prob-
ably cannot be ascertained precisely how ground water acts." 108 Mass. at 265. 
197. "Therefore he may dig a well, and make it very large, and draw up the water, by 
machinery or otherwise, in such quantities as to supply aqueducts for a large neighborhood." 
/d. 
198. 157 Mass. 431, 32 N.E. 650 (1892). 
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Davis was also the only other case besides Greenleaf to be decided 
under the rule of absolute ownership. The dispute did not involve in-
terference by pumping, but diversion of ground water away from a 
well to a surface water reservoir which the defendant had excavated 
on his land. Again, the defendant was held to be free of liability. The 
court recited the principle established in Wilson that ground water is 
identified with the soil itself.199 The court reasoned that, since 
ground water changes ownership when it flows from under one land-
owner's land to another's, a landowner may use any means to pre-
vent water from leaving his land.20o Thus, the defendant was free to 
capture his ground water in a reservoir. The rule does not, however, 
give an owner legal protection against similar efforts by his neigh-
bor, so it ultimately does not protect his exclusivity of ownership. 
Therefore, the rule fails to vest enforceable rights in ground 
water.201 
The old cases of Greenleaf and Davis show that under a strict appli-
cation of the rule of absolute ownership ground water users are free 
to engage in unrestrained physical competition for the water in an 
aquifer under their land. No matter what the consequences to a 
neighbor who loses his water supply, the courts will not interfere, 
but will leave the outcome to be determined by financiail resources 
and hydrological advantage. 
2. Exceptions to the Rule of Absolute Ownership 
In several cases decided after Greenleaf, the courts sought to avoid 
the hardship imposed by the rule of absolute ownership by limiting 
its application in certain special circumstances. The first group of 
cases202 is concerned with the effects of ground water withdrawals 
on surface water levels and would appear to bring the rule of abso-
199. The Davis court declared that "[w]ater percolating underground ... is the absolute 
property of the owner of the land, in the same way, and to the same extent, that the other con· 
stituent parts of his land are his absolute property .... " 157 Mass. at 435,32 N.E. at 651. 
200. Id. 
201. This conclusion was recognized by the United States District Court in Gallarani v. 
United States, 41 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. 1941). Applying Massachusetts ground water law to 
a case of well interference caused by excavation for the Cape Cod Canal, the court held that 
"[t]here is no property right in underground percolating waters, and any injury resulting from 
the loss of the same through the lawful acts of an adjoining landowner is considered dammum 
absque injuria." 41 F. Supp. at 294. Dammum absque injuria means injury without legal rem-
edy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed. 1979). The rule had a harsh effect in this case, since 
the plaintiff was unable to obtain another source of water supply and so could not farm his 
land. 
202. Spaulding v. Inhabitants of Plainville, 218 Mass. 321, 105 N.E. 1006 (191 4); Hollings-
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lute ownership into direct confrontation with the doctrine of riparian 
rights. In almost all of these cases203 the plaintiffs were mill owners 
who suffered from loss of water power when wells diverted water 
away from a stream or pond. The defendants in the cases were towns 
or private water supply companies which had legislative authoriza-
tion to develop water supplies. If the court had followed the rule of 
Acton v. Blundell,204 the injured mill owner would have had no cause 
of action against pumpers who were exercising an unqualified right 
to withdraw water from wells on their own land. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, however, declined to decide these cases 
under common law, but ruled that since the defendants held land 
under legislative authorization to provide water supply, they did not 
have the status of private landowners.205 Therefore, they did not 
have an absolute right to pump ground water, but were limited by 
the terms of the legislation. 
The results in the mill cases depended on the type of legislative 
enactment involved. If the act or charter authorized the defendant to 
take water directly from a river or pond on the condition of compen-
sating riparian owners for any ensuing harm, the defendant was 
obliged to pay damages even when it diverted water indirectly 
through wells or filter galleries.206 If, on the other hand, the defend-
ant was authorized to withdraw ground water from wells, but not to 
worth & Vose Co. v. Foxborough Water Supply Dist., 165 Mass. 186,42 N.E. 574 (1896); Pro-
prietors of Mills v. Braintree Water Supply Co., 149 Mass. 478, 21 N.E. 761 (1889); Cowdrey 
v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 136 Mass. 409 (1884); Hart v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 
Mass. 488 (1882); Att'y General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (1882); Aetna 
Mills v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 127 Mass. 69 (1879); Aetna Mills v. Inhabitants of Waltham, 
126 Mass. 422 (1879); Bailey v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 126 Mass. 416 (1879). Most of these 
cases are collected and discussed in Davis, supra note 76, passim. 
203. Two cases were not suits by mill owners. In Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Foxborough 
Water Supply Co., 165 Mass. 186,42 N.E. 574 (1896), the plaintiff was a water company which 
lost the water stored in its reservoir to another company's well. In Att'y General v. Jamaica 
Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (1882), a public nuisance case, the attorney general 
represented the public interest in a great pond which was degraded by over-pumping which 
lowered water levels and left decaying vegetation and mud flats, endangering public health 
and safety. [d. 
204. See supra text and notes at notes 187-92. 
205. E.g., Aetna Mills v. Inhabitants of Waltham, 126 Mass. 422 (1879). The court declared 
in Aetna Mills that "[t]he rights of owners ofland to appropriate to their own use underground 
currents of water are not involved in this inquiry." [d. at 426. 
206. E.g., Cowdrey v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 136 Mass. 409 (1884). In Cowdrey the court 
stated: 
The Legislature did not intend that the town should take or purchase land, and by dig-
ging a gallery or wells, intercept waters flowing into the pond, to the injury of other 
persons, without making compensation. On the contrary, its intention is clear, that if 
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withdraw water from a particular pond or stream, pumping which 
diverted surface water was held to be in excess of delegated authori-
ty and was enjoined.207 As the court declared in Proprietors of Mills 
v. Braintree Water Supply Co., 208 "If the water cannot be taken 
directly from Little Pond, it cannot be drawn therefrom by percola-
tion."209 In the mill cases, then, the court ordered either monetary or 
injunctive relief depending on the nature of the legislative authoriza-
tion for the defendant's action. 
Because of the nature of the defendants involved, these cases do 
not settle the question whether private landowners claiming an un-
limited right to pump may be subjected to liability to injured surface 
water users. As was stated in one case, "We do not now find it neces-
sary to consider what are the rights of landowners to appropriate to 
their own use underground currents of water found on their own 
land, or what are the exact limitations of such rights."210 The issue 
remains unresolved.211 
In the second group of cases in which Massachusetts courts 
avoided the rule of absolute ownership, statutory construction was 
again the basis for imposing liability for interference with water sup-
ply.212 In these cases, the injured parties were well owners who lost 
their water supply due to excavation and drainage for public con-
struction projects. The defendants were railroad companies and 
the town took away water directly from the pond, or water which naturally flows into 
it, compensation should be made to any person injured. 
[d. at 412. 
207. E.g., Att'y General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (1882). In Jamaica 
Pond, the court declared that "[t]he purposes for which the defendant is using the land taken 
are different from and foreign to the purposes for which it was authorized to take it. Its use of 
it for such purposes is a perversion ofthe powers granted it by the legislature." [d. at 366. This 
holding is based on the ultra vires doctrine. The doctrine was applied in a water case as recent-
ly as 1940, in Town of Holliston v. Holliston Water Supply Co., 306 Mass. 17,27 N.E.2d 194 
(1940). This case held that an authorized taking of all springs and streams did not permit the 
taking of property which contained only ground water. 306 Mass. at 22, 27 N.E.2d at 197. 
208. 149 Mass. 478, 21 N.E. 761 (1889). 
209. 149 Mass. at 484, 21 N.E. at 764. 
210. Cowdrey v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 136 Mass. 409, 412 (1884). 
211. In Connecticut, which also follows the rule of absolute ownership, the issue has been re-
solved in favor of injured riparian owners. Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 
234 A.2d 825 (1969). The riparian owner was successful against a well owner on the grounds 
that the absolute ownership rule of no liability applies only to interference with ground water 
uses; the riparian rule of reasonable use governs where pumping interferes with surface 
stream flows. 
212. Penney v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 507, 53 N.E. 865 (1899) (excavation for sewer); 
Sheldon v. Boston & Alby. R.R., 172 Mass. 180, 51 N.E. 1078 (1l898) (grading for railroad 
track); Trowbridge v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 144 Mass. 139, 10 N.E. 746 (1887) (excavation 
for sewer); Parker v. Boston & Me. R.R., 57 Mass. 107 (1849) (regrading for railroad tracks). 
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public works departments authorized by the legislature to carry out 
the projects. Although under the rule of Greenleafv. Francis213 land-
owners may dig in their soil with impunity, the excavation cases 
were also decided on the basis of statutory construction rather than 
common law principles. 
For example, in Parker v. Boston & Maine R.R.,214 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held the defendant liable for well inter-
ference when it altered its railroad grade and cut off the plaintiff's 
water supply. Under the authorizing statute, the court ruled, the 
railroad held only limited, usufructuary rights in land, and its in-
terest was conditional on payments of all damages caused by its 
use.215 As in the mills cases, the court ruled that the defendant did 
not stand in the position of a private landowner and, therefore, was 
not shielded by the rule of absolute ownership.216 Parker was fol-
lowed by the line of public improvements cases,217 which indicates 
that, except for the special nature of the defendants, the plaintiffs 
would have no enforceable rights. 
The third group of ground water cases in which the Massachusetts 
court declined to apply the rule of absolute ownership involves 
disputes over water pollution. Ground water pollution, like excava-
tion, may be regarded as a form of interference with water supply 
caused by an activity other than competing use. Massachusetts 
courts have curtailed the use of the absolute ownership doctrine in 
this area but have not provided an explicit rationale. 
Ball v. Nye218 is the leading case in this area. The defendant was a 
farmer who stored manure in the cellar of his barn and continued to 
do so even after the plaintiff, a neighboring landowner, complained 
of foul water in his well. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
imposed liability on the defendant on alternative grounds of (1) negli-
gence for unreasonably allowing contaminants to seep underground 
and migrate to "his neighbor's well; and (2) strict liability under the 
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,219 for bringing an instrumentality 
onto the land which escaped and harmed a neighbor.220 Incongruous-
ly, the opinion does not refer to rights in ground water at all, but 
213. 38 Mass. 117. See supra text and notes at notes 184-86. 
214. 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 107 (1849). 
215. Id. at 144. 
216. Id. 
217. Supra note 212. 
218. 99 Mass. (3 Browne) 582 (1868). 
219. L. R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). 
220. 99 Mass. at 584. 
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only concerns itself with injury to the plaintiff's well.221 Although the 
case appears to be correctly decided, under the rule of absolute own-
ership the result is illogical. If the defendant has an unqualified right 
to use ground water in his land because it belongs to him in the same 
way as the soil, then it appears arbitrary to impose liability on him for 
harm which the water causes after it leaves his ownership.222 Rylands 
v. Fletcher would not seem to apply because the ground water was not 
brought onto the defendant's land by artificial means.223 Despite 
these inadequacies in logic, the reasoning used in Ball has also been 
applied in other cases of ground water contamination.224 
A recent pollution case, Kane v. Town of Hudson, 226 indicates a 
new basis for imposing liability. In 1979, the Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals held that no one has a legal right to degrade unreasonably 
the quality of a common water supply, and that this rule applies to 
ground water as well as to surface streams.226 Unlike Ball v. Nye, 
this opinion explicitly recognizes rights in ground water quality. The 
court held that landowners with access to an aquifer, like riparian 
owners along a watercourse, have a right to draw unpolluted water 
and that activities on neighboring land must be consistent with this 
right.227 One commentator interprets this opinion as the first plank 
in a new Massachusetts ground water doctrine based on enforceable 
and reciprocal usufructuary rights.228 
3. Recent Developments Modifying the Rule of Absolute Ownership 
In addition to those special circumstances in which the Massachu-
setts courts have refused to apply the rule of absolute ownership, 
221. Id. 
222. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has applied the rule of absolute ownership more 
logically. In Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 45 R.1. 411, 173 A. 628 (1932), a case of well con-
tamination by seepage from gasoline storage tanks, the court denied relief under any of the 
three theories of negligence, strict liability, and nuisance. 
223. Cf Wilson v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 (1871) (artificial impoundment of water in a 
reservoir incurred liability) (discussed supra note 196). 
224. Other ground water pollution cases include Cull v_ Buttrick, 158 Mass. 345 (1849) 
(negligence in placing a cesspool too close to a well); Mears v. Dole, 135 Mass. 508 (1883) (strict 
liability for excavating a sand dune, allowing sea water to escape inland and contaminate a 
well); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 524 (1861) (negligence in laying a 
gas line and polluting a well); Fuller v_ Chicopee Mfg. Co., 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 46 (1860) (strict 
liability and statutory compensation for ground water flooding and pollution of well caused by 
reservoir). 
225. Kane v. Town of Hudson, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 389 N.E.2d 737 (1979). 
226. 7 Mass_ App. Ct. at 562, 389 N.E.2d at 741. 
227. Id. 
228. Nash, A Review of the Common Law and Statutory Law of Ground Water Use Man-
agement in the Northeastern United States (1980) (unpublished paper for Conference on 
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other developments in Massachusetts law signal a change in doc-
trine. One such decision apparently modifying the absolute owner-
ship rule is Gamer v. Town of Milton. 229 In that case, a contractor 
hired by the town to carry out a gravel mining operation pumped 
water from the site in such quantities that he lowered the water table 
in the area, causing house settling and other subsidence effects in a 
nearby residential area. In spite of the rule of absolute ownership, 
the court held the town liable for damages because its contractor had· 
negligently failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent subsi-
dence.23o 
If a landowner can be held liable for negligence in his efforts to 
control ground water, then his rights in this form of water are not 
absolute. The Gamer court explicitly upheld the absolute ownership 
rule for cases of ground water competition,231 but, by drawing a 
distinction between liability for harm to land and liability for harm to 
water supply, the court seemed to reject the legal identification of 
ground water with the soil. Thus, the decision undermines the 
justification for applying different rules to surface streams and 
ground water aquifers. 
Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated a willingness to up-
date another aspect of Massachusetts water law in conformance with 
modern policies of resource use. In a 1978 ground water flooding 
case, Tucker v. Badoian,232 the court prospectively changed the rule 
for controlling diffuse surface water - the surface run-off from 
storms which does not flow in defined streams. In this case, the 
plaintiff homeowner suffered a flooded basement when the defend-
ant, a developer, graded an adjoining lot to improve drainage. Under 
the traditional common law doctrine, the "common enemy rule," 
each landowner has an absolute right to alter surface drainage on his 
land by grading, filling, or obstructing flow, even if a neighbor suf-
fers from increased flooding as a result. 233 
Like the ground water rule of absolute ownership, the common 
enemy rule is an absolute shield against liability. This rule was 
followed in Tucker because the plaintiff had not argued for a change 
Ground Water Management in the Northeast, Cornell University Center for Environmental 
Research). 
229. 346 Mass. 617, 195 N.E.2d 65 (1958). 
230. 346 Mass. at 621, 195 N.E.2d at 67. 
231. [d. See supra note 181. 
232. 376 Mass. 907, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (1978). 
233. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106 (1865). 
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in the common law.234 Nevertheless, in an extraordinary concur-
rence, a majority of the justices announced that in the future a rule 
of reasonable use of land, based on tort rules of private nuisance, 
would be followed instead.236 Under the new rule, a landowner will 
be held liable for an unreasonable change in surface drainage which 
imposes unfair costs on a neighbor by causing foreseeable and signif-
icant flooding on this land.236 Although the holding is limited to the 
control of diffuse surface water and does· not alter ground water 
rights, Tucker is significant as a signpost on the road to adopting a 
new ground water doctrine which is also based on tort principles of 
reasonableness rather than absolute rules of property ownership. 
As was seen in the preceding discussion, the rule of absolute 
ownership was originally stated in very broad terms. Its application, 
however, has been cut back, and it may now be undergoing modifica-
tion. When analyzed in light of the five criteria presented in Section 
IV,237 the original doctrine fares poorly. 
4. Analysis of the Absolute Ownership Doctrine 
The doctrine of absolute ownership purports to give a landowner 
proprietary rights in the ground water beneath his land. In actuality, 
since the landowner is powerless to prevent another water user from 
interfering with the water that would otherwise be available to the 
landowner, and because a landowner is unable to prevent the exhaus-
tion of a common supply, his ownership rights are quite limited. In 
fact, he appears to have no rights at all. Instead, he has only an ab-
solute privilege of capturing as much ground water as he is able. The 
rule certainly does not protect usufructuary rights in this resource 
and so fails to meet the first criterion of a rational water doctrine. 
Nor is the doctrine based on current hydrological knowledge. In-
stead it rests on three assumptions which have all been discredited 
by modern hydrology: that ground water is a static form of property 
234. 376 Mass. at 915, 384 N.E.2d at 1200. 
235. 376 Mass. at 917-18, 384 N.E.2d at 1201 (J. Kaplan, concurring). 
236. Id. The Tucker concurrence stated: 
Perhaps a common enemy doctrine served originally a public purpose by stimulating 
or assisting entrepreneurship in the exploitation ofland. But, as Brennan, J. (now Mr. 
Justice Brennan), intimated in Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 330, 120 
A.2d 4 (1956), at a matured stage of the economy there is little reason why costs of 
land development 'should be borne in every case by adjoining landowners rather than 
by those who engage in such projects for profit.' 
376 Mass. at 917-18,384 N.E.2d at 1201 (J. Kaplan, concurring). 
237. See supra text and notes at notes 126-56. 
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in the same sense as rocks and minerals; that it is hidden and 
mysterious, moving in response to unknown and unknowable 
forces;238 and that there is an intrinsic difference between ground 
water and surface water. 239 These three fallacious assumptions pre-
vent a rational approach to ground water allocation.24o As seen in the 
cases discussed previously, such assumptions also result in incom-
patible systems of rights in ground water and surface streams. It is 
inconsistent to protect rights in a stream from unreasonable in-
terference by other users under the riparian doctrine, and then, 
under the ground water rule, to allow a well owner the absolute right 
to exhaust the water source. The Massachusetts courts have avoided 
some problems by treating different classes of landowners different-
ly,241 but this method will not suffice when two public suppliers or 
two private landowners compete for the same water supply. 
The rule of absolute ownership also fails to satisfy the need for 
economic efficiency and maximum beneficial use of water. Original-
ly, a rationale for adopting the rule was the fear that imposing liabili-
ty for unforeseeable effects of ground water withdrawal would dis-
courage resource development.242 In practice, however, the rule pro-
238. Some courts have expressed this idea poetically: "It rises to great heights, and moves 
collaterally, by influences beyond our apprehension. These influences are so secret, changeable 
and uncontroullable, we cannot subject them to the regulations of law, nor build upon them a 
system of rules, as has been done with streams upon the surface." Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 
532, 540 (1850). 
239. Coogan, supra note 5, at 40. 
240. For an approach attempting to reconcile the rule of absolute ownership with hydro-
logical knowledge, see Adams, Updating Groundwater Law: New Wine in Old Bottles, 39 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 520 (1978). The author proposes dividing the annual recharge of an aquifer propor-
tionately, based on the area of overlying land held by individual water users. Applying a 
"knowledge doctrine," the author suggests that courts could allocate to each landowner just 
that quantity of water which flows under his land each year and thereby comes under his 
ownership. A landowner could withdraw this quantity and no more. While conceptually this 
theory appears to be a neat solution to ground water allocation problems, it poses several dif-
ficulties: extensive and expensive hydrological analysis is required for every land parcel, and 
the area of land held by a ground water user may bear no relationship to the reasonable needs, 
whether the use is for industry or municipal water supply. Additionally, the doctrine takes no 
account of the need for ground water in the hydrological cycle to replenish streams and ponds. 
Adams' theory may be likened to carving up a stream and giving ownership rights in the water 
itself. This has never been attempted, because a flowing substance cannot be owned. 
241. See supra text and notes at notes 202"10. 
242. See, e.g., Davis v. Spaulding, 157 Mass. 431, 437, 32 N.E. 650, 652 (1892). But see Katz 
v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). In Katz the court declared: "We cannot per-
ceive how a doctrine offering so little protection to the investment in and product of such 
enterprises, and offering so much temptation to others to capture the water on which they de-
pend, can tend to promote developments in the future, or preserve those already made." 141 
Cal. at 134, 74 P. at 771. 
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vides no economic security at all. Under the dodrine a landowner 
has no assurance of holding his water right sinee a neighbor may 
deprive him of supply by the simple expedient of sinking deeper 
wells. The lack of economic security under the absolute ownership 
doctrine leads to unregulated physical competition for ground water 
and produces common pool problems.243 Where competitive over-
pumping occurs, external costs are imposed on other pumpers who 
must drill more deeply and expend more energy to raise the water, 
or lose their supply. Over-exploitation may also impose social costs 
by causing land subsidence, salt water intrusion, aquifer exhaustion, 
or depletion of streams and ponds. On the other hand, the rule may 
lead to under-utilization of ground water in some places, since a fear 
of competitive well interference discourages substantial invest-
ments. None of these effects are efficient or conducive to the most 
beneficial use of water. 
The present system of ground water rights in Massachusetts has 
not created intolerable problems so far, because water abundance 
provides some security. 244 The true test of a water allocation rule is 
how well it works in times of scarcity. Even in a water-rich state like 
Massachusetts local scarcity exists now, 245 and the problem is likely 
to become more widespread.246 The public interest in preserving 
ground water for future use is not promoted by a rule which en-
courages unlimited consumption regardless of incidental harm to the 
aquifer. 247 Nor does the rule protect public interest in recreation and 
the environmental values of ponds and streams. As long as the doc-
trine of absolute ownership gives a landowner an unqualified right to 
pump ground water regardless of effects on water resources, the law 
cannot promote public water rights under the public trust or public 
nuisance doctrines and, so, fails to achieve the fourth goal of a 
modern rule of water law.248 
Originally, the rule of absolute ownership was a rule of fairness, 
since judges were unwilling to rule in ignorance or place liability 
243. See supra text and notes at notes 60-61. 
244. Trelease, supra note 115, at 57; GROUNDWATER AND GROUNDWATER LAW IN MASSACHU· 
SETTS, supra note 13, at 71. 
245. See supra note 11. 
246. See supra note 12. 
247. Examples are salt water intrusion, compaction, and induced infiltration from polluted 
streams. 
248. For example, in the public nuisance case, Att'y General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct 
Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (1882), only by avoiding the rule of absolute ownership could the court 
enjoin excessive pumping. See supra note 207. The court noted that there was an alternative 
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where it could not be foreseen. 249 Now that this rationale no longer 
holds in most cases,250 the rule appears eminently unfair; it affords 
no protection to small pumpers; it allows the destruction of economic 
investment without compensation; and it imposes other costs which 
are not absorbed by the user who benefits from the resource.251 Mas-
sachusetts courts have succeeded in achieving fair results in several 
cases by avoiding the rule and relying on statutory grounds to pro-
tect water users who would otherwise have borne the expense of 
public benefits.252 That the courts must find some means of circum-
venting the rule to reach a fair result indicates the failure of the ab-
solute ownership rule to satisfy the fifth criterion for a rational 
ground water doctrine. As new cases come to the courts, in those 
cases where the rule cannot be avoided the rule should be overturned 
and a more rational and more equitable doctrine established in its 
place. 
Recent Massachusetts decisions in Tucker v. Badoian253 and Kane 
v. Hudson254 augur well for change in the common law of ground 
water rights. These decisions do not concern ground water alloca-
tion, but they do reflect a change in policy away from a laissez faire 
encouragement of resource development to a more progressive 
imposition of limits in the interests of fairness and social utility. A 
cause of action under the public trust doctrine in order to protect public rights to fishing, 
swimming, and boating in the great pond. 133 Mass. at 364. 
249. 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 103, § 619.1, at 159. In many jurisdictions 
courts have avoided the harsh effects of the absolute ownership doctrine and its successor, the 
rule of reasonable use, by recognizing a separate class of ground water - underground 
streams - to which surface water rules apply. Id. Underground streams are distinguished 
from percolating ground water by virtue of the fact that they flow in relatively well-defined 
channels from which courts reason that liability for interference with such streams is predict-
able, just as it is for surface streams. Actually, this class of underground streams is a legal fic-
tion, created to achieve fair results in certain cases. All ground water percolates through aqui-
fers. The exceptions are streams flowing through limestone caves, but these are seldom a 
source of water supply. Massachusetts courts have referred to underground streams in dicta, 
but all Massachusetts cases concern percolating ground water. 
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, ch. 41, at 255. 
251. The rule of absolute ownership was sustained as recently as 1973 in Vermont, in Drink-
wine v. State, 131 Vt. 127, 300 A.2d 616 (1973). In this case, a state fish hatchery pumped 
thousands of gallons of water daily from a high yield well and deprived the plaintiffs of their 
domestic water supply. The court in Drinkwine held that the plaintiffs had not shown that 
water had become so scarce in Vermont as to require a change in the common law. For an arti-
cle criticizing the Drinkwine opinion, see Comment, Groundwater Rights in Vermont, Drink-
wine v. State, VT. L. REV_ 189 (1979). 
252. See supra text and notes at notes 205-10. 
253. 376 Mass. 907, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (1978). See supra text and notes at notes 232-36. 
254_ 1979 Mass_ App. Ct. Adv. Sh_ 930, 389 N.E.2d 737 (1979). See supra text and notes at 
notes 225-28_ 
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similar change from the theory of absolute ownership of ground 
water to a more reasonable approach based on reciprocal rights is 
urged. Analysis of the three remaining alternative ground water 
rules will determine which one should replace the rule of absolute 
ownership in this jurisdiction. 
B. The American Rule of Reasonable Use 
1. Discussion of the Doctrine 
Dissatisfaction with the rule of absolute ownership has led to modi-
fications in the common law of ground water rights in many jurisdic-
tions. The first modification was the rule of reasonable use, or the 
American rule. 266 This rule gives landowners a right to extract 
ground water for a reasonable, beneficial use of the land from which 
it is taken.266 Because it requires a beneficial purpose, the rule pro-
hibits waste, in contrast to the rule of absolute ownership which only 
prohibits malicious pumping.267 In addition, beca.use it requires that 
the water be used on the overlying land, the rule distinguishes be-
tween two kinds of users: local users and transporters. Local users 
pump ground water to meet their needs for domestic water supply, 
irrigation, or industrial processing on their own land; transporters, 
on the other hand, are generally municipalities or water supply com-
panies which pump and distribute water for use away from the land. 
The rule of reasonable use appeared after the technological change 
to deep wells and mechanical pumps and probably reflects a policy of 
protecting small well owners who cannot afford to compete with city 
water suppliers.268 
The leading case which applies the reasonable use doctrine to a 
problem of ground water allocation is Forbell v. City of New York. 269 
In that case, a farmer sought an injunction when extensive with-
drawals from the city's well field lowered the water table and dried 
up his crop land. The New York Court of Appeals held that the with-
drawal of ground water for use on the overlying land is always 
255. The doctrine is followed in a majority of eastern jurisdictions. R. POWELL, supra note 
123, § 726. See, e.g., Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 72 N.E. 849 
(1904); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 603, 248 So.2d 106 (1968); Schenk v. City of Ann 
Arbor, 196 Mich. 75, 163 N.W. 109 (1917); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 249 (1861); 
Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); Township of Hatfield v. 
Lansdale Mun. Auth., 403 Pa. 113, 168 A.2d 333 (1961). 
256. Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 235, 255 P.2d 173, 178 (1953). 
257. See supra note 186. 
258. See supra text and notes at notes 157-58. 
259. 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900). 
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reasonable and thus permitted, but that extracting water for sale 
and use away from the land is unreasonable when it harms another 
landowner and so may be enjoined.260 The implication of this deci-
sion, and others following it,261 is that if a local user withdraws water 
for domestic supply, agriculture, or industrial purposes on his land 
he may pump as much ground water as he is able without regard for 
the effect on his neighbors, just as under the rule of absolute owner-
ship. Only transporters are restrained by the American rule.262 
While the American rule discriminates against water transporters, 
it does not prohibit the off-site use of water, because cities can pur-
chase the water rights of small users or otherwise compensate them 
for their loss. In Forbell, the court acknowledged that the city's need 
for water supply was more important than the farmer's celery crop, 
but ruled that the city could exercise the power of eminent domain 
and provide its people with water without injustice to the plaintiff. 263 
The American rule of reasonable use has been applied to other 
kinds of ground water problems besides well interference caused by 
another water user. When land is dewatered for mining, for exam-
ple, courts in reasonable use jurisdictions have declined to grant 
relief to injured well owners because mining is held to be a reason-
able use of land.264 This approach has been extended to cases where 
the harm caused is not loss of water supply but land subsidence. 265 
2. Analysis of the American Rule of Reasonable Use 
Courts and commentators have agreed that "the American rule of 
reasonable use as it is actually applied is not a different rule from the 
260. 164 N.Y. at 526, 58 N.E. at 646. 
261. See supra note 255 Oisting pertinent cases). 
262. Transporters have no rights vis-a-vis local users. It is unclear whether a transporter 
has a legally protected right to the surplus water in an aquifer, i.e., the water not needed by 
local users, and thus can restrain another transporter from interfering with its water supply. 
See Hanks and Hanks, supra note 155, at 640. 
263. 164 N.Y. at 527, 58 N.E. at 646. See also Township of Hatfield v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 
403 Pa. 113, 168 A.2d 333 (1961) Oiability imposed because off-site use is unreasonable per se; 
the court did not enjoin the use, but ordered the municipal water system to connect all affected 
users without charge). 
264. See, e.g., Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 154 S.E.2d 552 (1962) (pumping out 
mine resulting in salt water intrusion); Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 840, 47 P.2d 984 
(1935) (diversion of ground water into ditch). 
265. See, e.g., Finley v. Teeterstone, Inc., 251 Md. 603, 248 A.2d 106 (1968). But see 
Henderson v. Wade Sand and Gravel Co., 388 So.2d 900, 902 (Ala. 1980) (rules of nuisance, not 
water rights, apply where landowner pumps water for mining purposes because the issue is 
reasonable use of land, not use of water). 
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English rule, but is merely a limitation to it."266 No cases have been 
found under this rule in which a landowner was denied the right to 
pump as much water as he could use on his own land, even though in 
the process he drained his neighbor's supply.267 "Reasonable use," 
then, is a misnomer. Unlike the riparian doctrine of reasonable use, 
the ground water rule does not assess the reasonableness of a partic-
ular interference, but rather categorizes uses as either reasonable 
per se or unreasonable per se. The rule is essentially the rule of abso-
lute ownership with exceptions for wasteful and off-site use. 
The rule of reasonable use suffers from most of the same deficien-
cies as the rule of absolute ownership. Since the doctrine is essential-
ly another rule of unlimited right to capture ground water, it fails to 
satisfy the first criterion of protecting usufructuary rights in the 
resource. Like its predecessor, the American rule purports to safe-
guard proprietary rights in ground water, but aetually it recognizes 
only a local user's right not to be harmed by a transporter or by a 
wasteful ground water withdrawal. 268 The rule provides no protec-
tion from well interference by a large-scale local user, such as an in-
dustry, a public institution, or an irrigated farm. Nor does the rule 
provide relief when one transporter interferes with another trans-
porter's wells. As a result, the reasonable use doctrine does not ade-
quately protect a landowner's access to sources of water. 
Like the absolute ownership doctrine, the doetrine of reasonable 
use also does not take account of present hydrological knowledge to 
determine liability for well interference. As recently as H140, a court 
following the reasonable use doctrine declared that the difficulty of 
tracing the movement of ground water and the uncertainty of causa-
tion led it to the "only practical solution" of allowing each landowner 
to enjoy absolute property rights in the water under his land.269 The 
limitation on an owner who does not use the water for on-site pur-
poses, but sells it to municipal users remains the exception to the 
judicial reluctance to impose liability, perhaps explainable because 
cities and other transporters usually have thorough knowledge of the 
266. Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 55, 64 P.2d 694, 697 (1937). See also Hanks 
and Hanks, supra note 115, at 636. 
267. Cases applying the rule of reasonable use most often involve conflicts between cities 
and rural landowners, as in Forbell, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644. See Maloney and Plager, supra 
note 155, at 770. 
268. See supra note 256. 
269. Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. at 133-34, 14 A.2d at 90 (1940). 
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extent and yield of an aquifer before they install the machinery 
necessary to operate a water system.270 
The reasonable use doctrine also perpetuates the unscientific 
dichotomy between surface water and ground water created by the 
rule of absolute ownership. It therefore fails to create a unified 
system of surface and ground water rights and thus does not allow 
for rational allocation of water among all users. Despite the confus-
ing common name, the ground water rule of reasonable use is quite 
dissimilar from the riparian rule of reasonable use. The standards of 
reasonableness for the two rules are completely distinct. Under the 
ground water rule, reasonableness of a water use is determined sole-
ly in relationship to the location of the use.271 Under the surface 
water rule, on the other hand, reasonableness is determined in rela-
tionship to the co-equal rights of other landowners to make use of the 
water.272 Under riparian law, a landowner cannot withdraw all the 
water in a stream for his own use, but must share it on a proportion-
ate basis with other riparians. The ground water rule, on the other 
hand, does not prohibit a local user from draining an aquifer regard-
less of harm to other pumpers or surface water users. Thus, the rea-
sonable use doctrine fails to allocate ground water on the basis of 
hydrological knowledge and data. 
The American rule of reasonable use also fails to promote the max-
imum beneficial use of water273 - the third goal of a modern doctrine 
- because it does not create the necessary security of withdrawal 
rights. The rule merely protects against the risk of interference by a 
city, water company, or other transporter. Otherwise, investments 
in ground water development are as insecure as under the rule of 
absolute ownership, and efficient economic development will not oc-
cur. When ground water supplies are developed, the doctrine fails to 
resolve the common pool problem of over-competition because it 
does not provide a rational means of allocating supplies.274 
The goal of protecting public interests in ground water is better 
realized under the rule of reasonable use than under the rule of abso-
lute ownership, at least to the extent that waste is prohibited. Still, 
the social costs of over-pumping, such as degradation of aquifers and 
depletion of surface streams and ponds, are not reduced under this 
270. See, e.g., Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. at 524,58 N.E. at 645 (1900). 
271. Harnsberger, supra note 115, at 205. 
272. [d. For a discussion of riparian doctrine, see supra note 127. 
273. See supra text and notes at notes 129-45. 
274. See supra text and note at note 135. 
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doctrine. Consequently, the reasonable use rule does not completely 
achieve the objectives of the fourth criterion of a. modern water use 
doctrine, protection of the public interest. 
Unlike the rule of absolute ownership, the rule of reasonable use 
does promote the objective of fairness in one respect, since it pro-
vides compensation or some other remedy for private ground water 
users who would otherwise assume the burden of supplying the 
public with water. This modification was made in response to the 
development of high-yield wells which had drastic effects on other 
water users.275 Beyond this modification the rule fails to protect 
against interference by large local users, thereby leaving unsatisfied 
the need for an equitable ground water rule. The rigidity of the doc-
trine, like the rigidity of the rule of absolute ownership, leads to all-
or-nothing solutions which cannot satisfy expectations of a just 
system of dispute resolution. 
Analysis of the reasonable use doctrine leads to the conclusion that 
this rule does not comport with a modern system of ground water 
allocation. The rule does not protect usufructuary rights in water, 
nor does it use scientific data as a basis for decisions on water shar-
ing. It neither promotes public interest in ground water supply, nor 
satisfies the need for an equitable distribution of water. The next two 
approaches provide greater flexibility and offer courts the means for 
achieving more equitable and rational water allocation. 
C. The Correlative Rights Doct~ine 
1. Discussion of the Doctrine 
The third common law ground water doctrine, the rule of correla-
tive rights, provides that each owner of land overlying an aquifer has 
an equal and correlative right to the beneficial use of the water on his 
land and that, in a time of shortage, the common water supply may 
be apportioned among landowners on the basis of their reasonable 
needs.276 Like the rule of reasonable use, this dodrine distinguishes 
between local users and transporters and favors the former while 
restricting the latter.277 In other respects, the doctrine is markedly 
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 858, at 256. 
276. Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 81, 306 S.W.2d 111, 115 (1957). 
277. Under the American rule of reasonable use, local users are subject to no liability to 
transporters. See supra note 262. Under the doctrine of correlative rights, local users are sub-
ject to liability to transporters only for waste, as an unreasonable use. See supra text at note 
276. 
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different from both the rule of reasonable use and the rule of ab-
solute ownership. It allows for judicial allocation of finite supplies 
and provides flexibility by allowing courts to consider the relative 
needs of landowners in order to determine a reasonable allocation.278 
The doctrine of correlative rights was formulated in California, 
where water scarcity is the source of most water disputes. The lead-
ing case for the correlative rights doctrine, Katz v. Walkinshaw,279 
concerns competition between agricultural users and a municipal 
water supplier - the same type of dispute dealt with by the Forbell 
court, using the rule of reasonable use. In Katz the California 
Supreme Court adopted a rule of reasonable use which limits the 
rights of owners to the amount of water necessary for a useful pur-
pose on the overlying land.280 On this basis it restrained interference 
by the transporter.281 Nonetheless, the decision differs significantly 
from Forbell in two respects. First, Katz holds that while local uses 
take priority over off-site uses, transporters do have a right to with-
draw surplus water not needed by local users.282 Under the rule of 
reasonable use, transporters are merely permitted to capture ground 
water up to the point of interference with local users.283 By contrast, 
under the Katz rule, a transporter can protect its right against 
wasteful or malicious pumping by local users and against interfer-
ence by other transporters. The second and more significant differ-
ence between the doctrine of correlative rights and the rule of rea-
sonable use is that the California correlative rights doctrine provides 
for the allocation of water during a shortage. As the Katz court 
declared, when supply is insufficient disputes between local users 
will be settled by giving each one a "fair and just proportion." 284 
Therefore, the rule of the biggest pump will not prevail. It should 
also be noted that in Katz, the "fair and just proportion" standard 
applies only between landowners using ground water on their own 
land.285 Between a local user and a transporter, the local user will 
always take precedence,286 as under the rule of reasonable use. In 
278. Harnsberger, supra note 115, at 206. 
279. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). 
280. 141 Cal. at 134, 74 P. at 771. 
281. 141 Cal. at 135, 74 P. at 772. 
282. Id. 
283. See supra note 262. 
284. 141 Cal. at 135-36, 74 P. at 772. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
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conflicts between transporters, Katz suggests that the earlier 
pumper has the superior right, as under the doctrine of prior appro-
priation.287 
The principal issue arising under the doctrine of correlative rights 
is how to determine a "fair and just proportion.'" In California, the 
solution has been to allocate water based on previous pumping 
rates.288 When water shortage occurs, each pumper's average rate 
of withdrawal over a period of time is reduced by a fixed percentage 
so that all users can have a fair share of the reduced water supply. 289 
Commentators have suggested that, in the east, a fair portion of 
ground water supply should be determined on the basis of "compara-
tive reasonableness." 290 This principle guarantees each consumer a 
sufficient amount of water to satisfy his reasonable needs, compared 
to the needs of other consumers. Like the riparian doctrine of 
reasonable use, this rule requires a balancing of equities.291 
While the California ground water rule arose in response to the 
problem of water shortage in the western states, conflicts in the east 
more commonly result from well interference by a competing 
pumper.292 The issue usually is: who shall pay to deepen the 
plaintiff's well or to provide an alternative water supply? The cor-
relative rights doctrine has been used in resolving such conflicts in at 
least four states.293 Two cases which involve conflicts between local 
users illustrate the utility of this doctrine in problems of well in-
terference. 
287. [d. The rule is thus a hodge-podge: in a dispute between transporters the rule of prior 
appropriation applies; between a local user and a transporter the American rule of reasonable 
use governs; and between local users, the new doctrine of correlative rights will be followed. 
288. See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). 
289. [d. The aquifer in this case had suffered from ground water mining. The California 
Supreme Court ruled that each user was entitled to make the average withdrawal it had made 
over the previous four years, reduced by a fixed percentage, so that total use would not exceed 
safe yield. In this complex suit the court did not distinguish between local users and transport-
ers or between earlier and later appropriators. 
290. Harnsberger, supra note 115, at 206. 
291. [d. See also Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 644 n.91). 
292. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 641 n.82. 
293. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 11 {1957); MacAr-
tor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.:2d 417 (196:3); Erickson v. 
Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 105 Minn. 182, 117 N.W. 435 (1908); Nashville C. 
& St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446, 89 S.W.2d 889 (1935). See (tlso Higday v. 
Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1971). 
Jurisdictions which have adopted the correlative rights doctrine still apply the American 
rule of reasonable use to conflicts between local users and transporters. See, e.g., Higday v. 
Nickolaus, 469 S.W. 2d 859 (Mo. App. 1971). 
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InMacArtorv. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc. ,294 the Delaware 
Court of Chancery resolved a dispute which arose after a private 
club sank a well and pumped large quantities of water for its swim-
ming pool. A nearby home owner's shallow well failed because the 
water table was drawn down below its reach. In order to determine 
the liability of the club for the loss of the homeowner's well, the court 
evaluated each party's water use on the basis of comparative reason-
ableness.295 Of the factors considered by the court, the most weight 
was given to the kind of use and the relative rates of withdrawal by 
each user.296 In holding the club liable for an unreasonable interfer-
ence, the court based its opinion on the common law preference for 
domestic use297 and the fact that the club's withdrawals exceeded the 
"normal" residential water supply required for the area it 
occupied.298 The court then arrived at a physical solution for the 
problem: it enjoined the club from further interference on the condi-
tion that the plaintiff allow the club to deepen his well or connect his 
home to the club's water system.299 
In the second case which appears to follow the doctrine of correla-
tive rights, Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry CO.,300 the Arkansas 
Supreme Court enjoined a poultry farmer who used thousands of 
gallons of water daily from pumping water in such quantities that 
two household wells failed.301 There was no possibility of a physical 
solution such as deepening the wells, since the plaintiffs had already 
deepened their wells from less than fifty to one hundred and fifty 
feet.302 In this case, a fair allocation of water among the three users 
294. 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 417 (1963). 
295. 41 Del. Ch. at 30, 187 A.2d at 420. The court in MacArtor did not state that it was 
adopting the doctrine of correlative rights, nor refer to any of the other ground water rules. 
Rather, it declared that it would apply the doctrine of "reasonable user," or nuisance. [d. 
296. The other factors were the defendant's lack of malicious intent, the relative productiv-
ity of the wells, the numbers of users, and the concentration of use. [d. 
297. Domestic water supply is given preferential treatment under the doctrine of riparian 
rights. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, at 212 introduction to chapter VI. 
298. 41 Del. Ch. at 30, 187 A.2d at 420. The court in MacArtor did not state that it was 
adopting the doctrine of correlative rights, or refer to any of the other ground water rules. 
Rather, it declared that it would apply the doctrine of reasonable use (nuisance). [d. 
299. [d. 
300. 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957). 
301. 228 Ark. at 82, 306 S.W.2d at 115. The court announced that it was adopting the 
American rule, but its quotation from a California opinion indicates that it meant the doctrine 
of correlative rights. See supra note 276. The Jones court also declared that the same rule of 
reasonableness governing the rights of riparian owners would govern percolating waters. 228 
Ark. at 80, 306 S.W.2d at 113. 
302. Id. 
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was achieved by limiting the pumping rate of the large user in order 
to satisfy the reasonable needs of the small users.308 As in the 
Delaware case, the Arkansas court weighed the lleasonableness and 
utility of each conflicting use. Both decisions are tied to an evalua-
tion of individual circumstances. The doctrine of correlative rights, 
therefore, is a true rule of reasonableness, since it limits each land-
owner's rights according to the reasonable needs of other landown-
ers over a common aquifer. Thus, in this context withdrawals which 
cause unreasonable harm will be restrained. 
2. Analysis of the Correlative Rights Doctrine 
The rule of correlative rights stands up much better under critical 
analysis than the previously considered ground water rules. Under 
the correlative rights doctrine, the owners of land overlying an 
aquifer have a usufructuary right to the use of the water in the 
aquifer. In contrast to the two previous rules, the correlative rights 
doctrine does not vest ownership rights in the water. Therefore, 
ground water users may be made to share an aquifer just as riparian 
landowners are made to share the benefits of a surface stream.304 
Each pumper is limited to a rate of withdrawal which does not unrea-
sonably interfere with reasonable water use by his neighbors. 805 
The correlative rights doctrine also satisfies the second criterion 
for a rational system of water rights, because it is firmly grounded in 
modern hydrological principles. The concept of equitable shares is 
based not only on a hydrological connection between user:s, but also 
on a determination of the safe yield of their common aquifer. Thus, 
where the danger of salt water intrusion,806 aquifer compaction,807 
or some other harmful side-effect of pumping808 exists, the courts 
can use an assessment of safe yield as the basis for allocating shares 
and preventing over-pumping. Moreover, since landowners share 
the use of a common supply, just as riparian owners share the flow of 
a stream, the correlative rights doctrine allows for the creation of a 
unified body of water law. 309 In the east, the rule harmonizes ground 
303. 228 Ark. at 82, 306 S.W.2d at 115. 
304. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 641. 
305. Because the rights are usufructuary, the constitutionality of llegislative regulation may 
be more easily upheld under this doctrine. See supra note 123. 
306. See supra text and note at note 67. 
307. See supra text and note at note 85. 
308. See supra text and note at note 72 (depletion of stream flows). 
309. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 643. The authors argue persuasively that the rule 
of correlative rights should be adopted in eastern jurisdictions as the most rational and most 
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water allocation with the exercise of riparian rights.310 A unified 
system of water rights enables a riparian owner to enjoin unreason-
able ground water withdrawals which deplete a surface stream. 
Similarly, a ground water user can enjoin a surface water diversion 
which unreasonably affects aquifer recharge. 311 
The doctrine of correlative rights also promotes efficient use of 
ground water, since it provides greater economic security than the 
previously described rules. Landowners who depend on ground 
water for supply or who have made substantial investments in 
ground water development are protected from a bigger pump and 
will not lose their rights while they can still put the water to a benefi-
cial use. This protection is not absolute, however, since it is based on 
the comparative reasonableness of competing uses by other land-
owners. When water is scarce, each user's right to withdraw water 
may be reduced to a fair share so that no one will lose his water 
rights in favor of another. This system of allocation cures the com-
mon pool problem by giving each pumper a protected property right 
to use a portion of the water, and thus reduces well races and 
waste.312 
The public interest in ground water is also given greater protection 
by the rule of correlative rights than by the other common law rules. 
Not only can wasteful use of water be enjoined, but unreasonable 
harm to aquifers, such as salt water intrusion, is prohibited. Future 
water supplies thus can be preserved. Finally, since riparian rights 
can be protected from unreasonable ground water diversion, public 
interests in recreational uses and environmental functions of ponds 
and streams can also be legally safeguarded from excessive pumping 
under either the public nuisance or the public trust doctrine.313 
Because the doctrine of correlative rights provides for considera-
tion of particular facts and circumstances in determining an 
equitable balance between competing uses, it also promotes the goal 
fair of the judicial rules for ground water allocation. They further assert that the leading New 
Jersey case, Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909), which had been 
classified as a reasonable use case, is consistent with correlative rights theory. 
310. Courts have explicitly recognized this advantage of the correlative rights doctrine. See, 
e.g., Higday v. Nickolaus, 649 S.W.2d 859,869-70 (Mo. App. 1971) ("The application of such a 
uniform legal standard would also give recognition to the established interrelationship be-
tween surface and ground water and would, therefore, bring into one classification all waters 
over the use of which controversy may arise"). See also discussion supra text and note at note 
127. 
311. See supra text and notes at notes 23, 35. 
312. See supra text and notes at notes 60-61. 
313. See supra text and notes at notes 148-53. 
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of fairness. Equities which have been considered in the case law in-
clude the purpose of the ground water use,314 the economic and 
social value of the use,315 the magnitude of withdrawals,316 the ex-
tent of harm,317 and alternative methods for satisfying needs.318 
When courts balance the equities and require a pumper who causes 
an unreasonable interference to provide a hook-up for a neighbor or 
deepen his well, the interfering user internalizes the costs of his 
operation. Not only is this fair, it also encourages pumpers to use 
water efficiently. 
Although the doctrine of correlative rights protects the rights of 
local users, its major drawback is that it does not provide a means for 
resolving conflicts between transporters. No eastern cases have 
dealt with this issue. The problem is bound to arise, however, as com-
petition increases for ground water supplies.319 The solution may be 
for courts to eliminate the distinction between local users and 
transporters and apply the rule of correlative rights to all ground 
water disputes regardless of where the water is eventually con-
sumed.320 
The doctrine of correlative rights has also been criticized by some 
commentators for creating legal costS.321 It is true that a water allo-
cation system administered by the courts suffers from problems of 
delay, litigation expense, and lack of expertise.322 As Justice Shaw 
remarked in Katz v. Walkinshaw,323 however, if the rule is a good 
one, the difficulty of applying it in complex cases is not a good reason 
for abandoning it and "leaving property without any protection from 
the law."324 Evidentiary problems created by the doctrine - estab-
lishing a causal connection, assessing the safe yield of an aquifer, and 
determining the reasonableness of use - are difficult, but not insur-
mountable. Rules based on considerations of reasonableness, like the 
314. Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W. 2d 869 (Mo. App. 1971). 
315. MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, 41 Del. Ch. 26, 189 A.2d 417 (1963). 
316. Id. 
317. Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 105 Minn. 182, 117 N.W. 435 
(1908). 
318. MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, 41 Del. Ch. 26, 189 A.2d 417 (1963). 
319. The California courts' approaches to transporter disputes -- the prior appropriation 
rule of mutual prescription - might not be favored by an eastern court. For a full discussion of 
this aspect of the correlative rights doctrine, see Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 645-48. 
320. Id. at 646. 
321. Harnsberger, supra note 115, at 208. 
322. Id. 
323. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). 
324. 141 Cal. at 136, 74 P. at 772. 
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correlative rights and riparian doctrines, are also criticized for lack 
of legal certainty, because liability is imposed on subjective stand-
ards and is therefore unpredictable.325 Although the doctrine of cor-
relative rights satisfies each of the five criteria for a rational system 
of water law, a more effective system of water rights would make 
the reasonableness rule more predictable without sacrificing fair-
ness. The last approach to ground water allocation appears to have 
this advantage. 
D. The Restatement of Torts Rule 
1. Discussion of the Rule 
The most recent formulation of rights and liabilities in the use of 
ground water is the rule proposed by the authors of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.326 Section 858 of the Restatement is a rule for the 
allocation of ground water which directly addresses the problem of 
well interference as well as water shortage problems.327 So far, the 
Restatement approach has been adopted by one jurisdiction -
Wisconsin,328 which previously followed the rule of absolute owner-
ship.329 In essence, section 858 of the Restatement proposes a rule of 
reasonableness which is derived from the correlative rights doctrine 
for ground water and the doctrine of riparian rights for surface 
water. 
Section 858 provides: 
Liability for Use of Ground Water -
(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground 
water from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not 
subject to liability for interference with the use of water by 
another unless 
325. See Clark, supra note 139, at 809-10. 
326. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 858, at 258. 
327. This contrasts with the rule of correlative rights, which was formulated to resolve 
shortage problems in California. See supra note 279. 
328. State v. Michels Pipeline Constr. Co., 63 Wis.2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974). The case 
was not a conflict between ground water users, but a public nuisance action brought by the at-
torney general on behalf of private well owners injured when land was drained for pipeline 
construction. It may be compared with Massachusetts public improvements cases, supra text 
and note at note 17l. 
The Restatement rule was also followed by the trial court in a Nebraska case, Prather v. 
Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978), in determining that pumping for irrigation 
had unreasonably interfered with a domestic water supply. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court cited the rule with approval, although it declared that the jurisdiction follows a combina-
tion of the American and correlative rights doctrines. 200 Neb. at 16, 261 N.W.2d at 771. 
329. Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 335, 94 N.W. 354 (1903). 
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(a) the withdrawal of ground water unreasonably causes harm 
to a proprietor of neighboring land through lowering the 
water table or reducing artesian pressure, 
(b) the withdrawal of ground water exceeds the proprietor's 
reasonable share of the annual supply or total store of 
ground water, or 
(c) the withdrawal of the ground water has a direct and sub-
stantial effect upon a watercourse or lake and unreason-
ably causes harm to a person entitled to the use of its 
water.sso 
Like the other common law rules, the Restatement approach con-
fers on a landowner the right to pump water from an aquifer under 
his land. Unlike the rule of reasonable use and the doctrine of correl-
ative rights, however, the landowner is not restricted to an on-site 
use of the water pumped from the aquifer. Therefore, the Restate-
ment does not establish a preference for local users over transport-
ers. All users, whether pumping for on-site or off-site purposes, have 
equal rights to the ground water. Under section 858, a landowner's 
right to withdraw ground water is only limited when his use unrea-
sonably interferes with a neighbor'S use, because each holds co-equal 
rights in the water. 331 In this respect, the Restatement approach cor-
responds to the doctrine of correlative rights and its standard of 
comparative reasonableness. Three kinds of unreasonable interfer-
ence with a landowner's right to use ground water are prohibited: 
well interference, monopolization, and diversion from surface water. 
In a case of well interference, the test of liability is whether pump-
ing has caused an unreasonable lowering of the water table or unrea-
sonable reduction in artesian pressure.332 The Restatement recog-
nizes that any use of ground water will have some effect on an aqui-
fer and that a reasonable effect must be allowed as of right.333 An 
unreasonable effect occurs when a new pumper withdraws a dispro-
portionately greater amount of water than other users, causing their 
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, S 858, at 258. Subsection (2) states 
that "[t]he determination of liability under clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Subsection (1) is governed 
by principles stated in Sections 850 to 857." Id. Sections 850 and 857 of the Restatement set 
forth the rule of riparian rights. 
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, S 858, at 262. 
332. See Weston and Gang, supra note 115, at 16 (asserting that under the Restatement 
rule landowners give up the right to remove all the water under their land in exchange for a 
guarantee of a relatively constant water table, and that the rule avoids formal disputes by en-
couraging self-apportionment). 
333. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, S 858, at 261 comment on clause (a). 
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wells to fail. 334 Therefore, the first test for unreasonable interfer-
ence is the relative magnitude of withdrawals. In this light, a dispro-
portionate withdrawal may be unreasonable per se. 
When a new ground water use is not disproportionately large rela-
tive to existing uses, but well interference still occurs, the courts 
may use a second test for unreasonable harm.335 This test was origi-
nally developed for assessing the reasonableness of riparian use of a 
watercourse and involves consideration of several factors: 
(a) the purpose of the use, 
(b) the suitability of the use to the water course or lake [or aqui-
fer], 
(c) the economic value of the use, 
(d) the social value of the use, 
(e) the extent and amount of harm it causes, 
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or 
method of one of the proprietors, 
(g) the protection of existing values of water uses, land, invest-
ment, and enterprises, and 
(h) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the 
loss.336 
Under this system the court first assesses whether, on the basis of 
the first four factors, the plaintiff's use is reasonable, thus giving 
him an enforceable right. Then, according to all the criteria, the 
court determines if the defendant's use is wasteful or malicious and 
thus unreasonable per se, or if it causes unreasonable harm. Upon 
reaching either of these conclusions, the court subjects the defend-
ant to liability. The court may weigh all circumstances and consider 
all practical remedies - including restraining withdrawals or com-
pelling the defendant to pay for deepening the plaintiff's well. 337 
Comments to clause (a) of section 858 suggest some of the other 
kinds of unreasonable interference besides disproportionate with-
drawal which entail liability. 338 First, when a well is sunk too close to 
an existing well, as in the early Massachusetts case of Greenleaf v. 
Francis,339 there is a cause of action for well interference because 
the defendant probably could have reached the aquifer without harm 
334. Id. Illustrations provided for clause (a) indicate that a disproportionately large use per 
se causes unreasonable harm. 
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 850A, at 220. 
336. Id. These factors parallel the factors considered under the doctrine of correlative 
rights. See supra notes 314-18. 
337. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 850A, at 226. 
338. Id., § 858, at 263 comment on clause (a). 
339. 38 Mass. 117 (1836), discussed supra text and notes at notes 184-86. 
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to his neighbor by drilling on another part of his land.340 A second ex-
ample is excessive pumping from a coastal aquifer which induces salt 
water to replace fresh water and makes the water unsuitable for 
other users.341 
With respect to monopolization, clause (b) of section 858 provides 
that a landowner's right to withdraw ground water is limited by 
others' equal rights when the yield of an aquifer is insufficient for all 
developed uses.342 He may not take more than his fair share. In this 
case, the rule follows the principle of equitable sharing first articu-
lated by the California Supreme Court in Katz v. Walkinshaw. 343 The 
comment on this subsection notes that the idea of sharing according 
to reasonable needs is an extension of the correlative rights 
doctrine.344 The comment also suggests that the water of an aquifer 
could be allocated on the basis of the area of land held by each 
user.345 This method is reasonable if the water is used for agricultur-
al irrigation, but is not a fair basis for sharing ground water which is 
needed for industry, home use, or institutional water supply.346 
Whichever method is used, the effect of the prohibition against 
monopolization is similar to the apportionment of the flow of a sur-
face stream among riparian landowners. Like riparians, landowners 
over an aquifer have an equal right in the initial development of the 
water, but if they delay in exercising that right, they may not be per-
mitted to impair existing investments once a limited water supply 
has been developed.347 In this context landowners with developed 
uses have a right to the water in the aquifer underneath their prop-
erty to the extent of their proportionate share. 
Finally, with respect to surface water levels, under clause (c) of 
section 858 a landowner is restricted from pumping ground water 
when his withdrawals directly cause a significant loss of stream flow 
or significantly lower the water level of a pond.348 Under the Re-
statement formulation, liability may be imposed when a nearby 
340. This activity incurs liability, applying factor (0 of the § 850A test. See supra text at 
note 336. 
341. This activity incurs liability, applying factors (b) and (e) of the § 850A test. See supra 
text at note 336. 
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 858, at 264-65 comment on clause 
(b). 
343. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903). See supra text at notes 223-27. 
344. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, S 858, at 264 comment on clause (b). 
345. [d. 
346. Hanks and Hanks, supra note 115, at 638 n.73. 
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 858, at 265 comment on clause (a). 
348. [d. at 266-67 comment on clause (c). 
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riparian landowner or owner of a pond is unreasonably harmed by 
excessive ground water withdrawals. Essentially, the Restatement 
gives a landowner a property interest in the ground water which is 
necessary to sustain minimum surface flows in order to protect his 
surface water use or preserve the property value of his land. 
It should be noted that, like the doctrine of correlative rights, the 
Restatement rule addresses only disputes between water users; 
other kinds of ground water problems, such as pollution, subsidence, 
and interference by mining and excavation, are treated in other sec-
tions of the Restatement.349 This separation of allocation problems 
from problems of nuisance and negligence is an important feature of 
the rule, since it clarifies the concept of ground water rights and thus 
marks an advance over the earlier common law doctrines which 
lumped different kinds of problems together. 
2. Analysis of the Restatement Rule 
The Restatement rule meets the requirements for a rational sys-
tem of water rights at least as well as the doctrine of correlative 
rights and has some further advantages over that rule. Like the doc-
trine of correlative rights, section 858 of the Restatement gives land-
owners a property right to the reasonable use of ground water under 
their land. This usufructuary right is enforceable against unrea-
sonable interference by other pumpers. Since the rule creates defi-
nite rights in ground water, it allows nuisance actions to be main-
tained against ground water polluters, diverters of surface water, 
and landowners who interfere with ground water flow by mining or 
excavation. 
Again, like the doctrine of correlative rights, the Restatement rule 
of ground water rights rests on modern hydrological principles. Lia-
bility is determined first of all by measuring the relative effect of 
withdrawal on the water table.350 This objective standard makes 
clear that evidence of hydrological causation is the most important 
factor in a ground water case. Allocating scarce supplies under sec-
tion 858 requires additional hydrological knowledge of the annual 
rate of recharge or total storage of an aquifer. 351 Finally, proof of a 
direct hydrological connection between ground water and surface 
water is necessary under the Restatement rule when a riparian 
349. See id. § 832 (liability for water pollution); § 849 (liability for interference by mining or 
other non-water use); § 819 (strict liability for land subsidence caused by water extraction). 
350. Id. § 858, at 258 clause (a). 
351. See supra text and notes at notes 3;:!-34. 
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owner seeks relief for harm to stream or pond. 'Thus, the Restate-
ment rule fulfills the second criterion of a modern water allocation 
doctrine because it is based upon an understanding of hydrological 
principles. 
Both the doctrine of correlative rights and the Restatement rule 
succeed in translating the riparian doctrine of reasonable use to the 
ground water level. Thus, a unified system of rights in surface 
streams and ground water is possible under either approach. Under 
a unified system, courts can consider the reasonable needs of 
riparian landowners when allocating scarce ground water supplies. 
Where stream flows are dependent on ground water discharge, as in 
Massachusetts,352 the system would be a valuable tool for protecting 
the interests of stream owners in their fair share of water. By mak-
ing this water right explicit353 the Restatement rule provides more 
certainty for riparian owners and for others - including the public -
who have rights in surface streams. 
The Restatement rule also promotes the maximum beneficial use 
of water by encouraging efficient development of ground water sup-
plies. By protecting pumpers against unreasonable interference, the 
rule makes water rights more secure, safeguards investments, and 
discourages inefficient use by pumpers. Since liability is based on 
unreasonable harm caused by lowering the water table, the rule puts 
a large water consumer on notice that it should conduct hydrological 
tests before pumping in order to predict the effeets of its use and to 
internalize costs by buying rights, providing hook-ups, or deepening 
wells. Thus, by avoiding formal disputes, section 858 creates a more 
rational system of water rights than the other common law ap-
proaches. 
The more objective standards of the Restatement approach make 
ground water rights more definite and secure than they are under 
the correlative rights doctrine. Furthermore, unlike that doctrine, 
the Restatement rule does not discriminate against transporters. 
Thus, the development of ground water for a municipal water 
system can be protected against unreasonable harm caused by a 
large local user or by another municipal pumper. In a time of short-
age, the yield of an aquifer can be fairly apportioned between com-
peting towns or other transporters on the basis of the reasonable 
needs of the populations they supply. Reasonable quotas can be 
established for all pumpers drawing from an aquifer, since all have 
352. See supra note 76. 
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 858, at 258 clause (c). 
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equal rights. The ability of the Restatement rule to address such 
problems corrects a deficiency in the correlative rights doctrine. 
The rule of the Restatement also satisfies the fourth criterion for a 
rational water rights doctrine by protecting public rights and needs 
for water supply. The protection of aquifers and future water supply 
from incidental harm caused by ground water withdrawals is possi-
ble under clause (a) of the rule. Compaction and salt water intrusion, 
for example, can be prevented by restraining excessive pumping. 
Moreover, section 858 explicitly protects rights to minimum stream 
flows and pond levels.364 Therefore, actions against well owners can 
be maintained under the Restatement rule and the public trust doc-
trine together to prevent harm to public interests in water recrea-
tion, scenic beauty, and water ecosystems. 
As one court has observed,366 the Restatement rule also meets the 
fairness criterion because it does not allow later users with superior 
economic resources to impose costs upon smaller water users that 
are beyond their means.366 Like the correlative rights doctrine, sec-
tion 858 of the Restatement provides courts with means for balanc-
ing the equities between water uses. The most important factor for 
consideration in this balance is the relative magnitude of use. Where 
that is not disproportionate, other factors such as well spacing, the 
nature of the use, and the measures of reasonableness provided by 
section 850A367 will be considered. A pumper whose activity causes 
unreasonable harm is compelled to internalize the costs of his pump-
ing. Not only is this effect fair, it also discourages inefficient use and 
prevents common pool problems. 
The Restatement rule provides a more objective standard of rea-
sonableness than the doctrine of correlative rights. Some critics, 
however, maintain that liability is still too uncertain under section 
858.368 Although a rule of reasonableness in water law or in tort law 
can never be entirely objective and predictable, this drawback is not 
of itself a good reason to reject the rule. After all, the rule of absolute 
354. Id. 
355. State v. Michels Pipeline Constr. Co., 63 Wis.2d 278, N.W.2d 339 (1974). 
356. 63 Wis.2d at 301, 217 N.W.2d at 35l. 
357. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 118, § 850A, at 220. 
358. Lowe, supra note 115, at 141-44. The authors urge the adoption of a permit system 
based on prior appropriation principles for critical ground water areas in eastern states. For 
other parts of a state, where ground water supply is adequate in quantity and quality, they 
propose a novel rule which limits the liability of a pumper to the proportion which his use of 
ground water bears to all other uses of the same aquifer. Id. at 144-47. The rule would be 
especially useful in cases of multiple defendants. The proposals would require legislative ac-
tion, however, rather than a change in judicial doctrine. 
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ownership is entirely predictable - it eliminates all liability for inter-
ference - but it fails to satisfy any of the criteria for a rational sys-
tem of ground water rights. The Restatement rule seems to provide 
as much certainty as can be expected from a common law doctrine. 
The ground water rules which have been analyzed show a progres-
sion from a rigid theory of private ownership of resources, as repre-
sented by the rule of absolute ownership and the American rule of 
reasonable use, to a concept of shared use of a common resource, as 
represented by the doctrine of correlative rights and the Restate-
ment rule. The first successor to the original rule of absolute owner-
ship, the American rule of reasonable use, made only modest gains 
over that doctrine by prohibiting waste and protecting investments 
in water supply for homes and farms from the powerful pumps of 
city suppliers. The rule made progress toward the goals of maximiz-
ing the beneficial use of water and promoting fairness, but fell far 
short of achieving all the goals of a water allocation system. The next 
rule, the doctrine of correlative rights, represented a significant ad-
vance, for it established that ground water is not owned by in-
dividuals but shared among landowners with equal rights to a 
reasonable use of the water. The doctrine recognizes the hydro-
logical connection and interdependence between landowners over an 
aquifer as a situation analogous to the connection between riparian 
landowners along a stream or river. In addition to providing for 
more efficient use of water and for more equitable conflict resolu-
tion, the doctrine of correlative rights can be used to preserve public 
interests in ground water as a source of water supply and replenish-
ment for streams and ponds. While the correlative rights doctrine in-
corporates all the elements of a modern ground water doctrine, its 
actual application is subject to limitation and uncertainty. 
The most recent rule, proposed by the Restatement of Torts, 
builds on the correlative rights doctrine. It incorporates the advan-
tages of that rule and also makes ground water rights more certain. 
Section 858 makes explicit that a pumper will incur liability for 
unreasonable harm to another pumper or to holders of surface water 
rights, and the standard of reasonable use is more objective and 
more predictable than the correlative rights doctrine. Finally, the 
Restatement rule treats all pumpers alike, regardless of the location 
of use, and so can resolve conflicts between municipalities. There-
fore, this rule best satisfies the five criteria for a modern ground 
water doctrine and should be adopted in Massachusetts. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Although historically Massachusetts has benefited from ample 
precipitation,359 with extensive natural water supplies provided both 
by rivers and aquifers,360 ground water supply has become limited in 
some areas of the Commonwealth as a result of urban develop-
ment361 and increased water consumption.362 Ground water is likely 
to be more widely utilized in the future as needs for water supply in-
crease and surface water reservoirs become inadequate. 363 There-
fore, the legal system must face the task of apportioning limited 
quantities of ground water among competing users. The present 
judicial doctrine for resolving disputes over the allocation of this im-
portant resource - the rule of absolute ownership364 - is now obso-
lete and should be replaced by a more flexible rule adapted to modern 
scientific knowledge and modern policies of resource development. 
Of the four common law doctrines which have been analyzed, the 
rule of the Restatement of Torts365 best satisfies the five criteria 
established for assessing a modern ground water doctrine. 366 
Three features of the Restatement formulation of ground water 
rights make it especially appropriate for Massachusetts. First, be-
cause it is based on concepts of reasonableness and the reciprocal 
rights of landowners having access to a common aquifer, this rule is 
compatible with riparian doctrine in the jurisdiction;367 courts will be 
able to integrate water rights under the two doctrines into one body 
of law, creating a legal uniformity which parallels the actual hydro-
logical connection between ground and surface water. Second, the 
Restatement rule provides for sharing scarce water supplies. This 
judicial tool is essential in a state like Massachusetts where shallow 
aquifers have little storage potential and are closely related to sur-
face streams and ponds.368 Finally; under section 858, courts will be 
able to uphold the administrative allocations of ground water for 
359. Supra text and note at note 38. 
360. Supra text and notes at notes 39-50. 
361. Supra text and notes at notes 86-95. 
362. Supra text and note at note 46. 
363. Supra text and notes at notes 10-11. 
364. Greenleaf v. Francis, 38 Mass. 117 (1836); discussed supra text and notes at notes 
184-86. See generally supra text at notes 176-201. 
365. Supra text and notes at notes 126-56. 
366. Supra text and notes at notes 86-124. 
367. See supra note 127. 
368. See supra text and notes at notes 76-78. 
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public water supply which are already being made by the state 
environmental agency. 369 
Of all the doctrines considered, the Restatement rule offers the 
clearest guidance for fair solutions to the conflicts posed in the Intro-
duction. 370 Injured parties who would be left without a remedy under 
the rule of absolute ownership, and who might also fail to obtain 
relief under one or more of the other rules, have potentially enforce-
able rights under the Restatement approach. They would be entitled 
to money damages, a fair share of the water, a restraint on well 
interference, or other injunctive relief - all remedies which are not 
available under the present Massachusetts doctrine. These examples 
plainly illustrate the need for change in common law rights to ground 
water'; the Restatement rule clearly suggests the approach and goals 
which such reform should pursue. 
369. See supra text and notes at notes 105-12. 
370. See supra text and note at note 2. 
